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The objective of this PhD thesis is the study, the design and the prototype implementation
of an agent-based automated negotiation mechanism to support the development of smart
Service Based Applications having as a reference scenario the smart cities of the future
intended as a realistic market of services. The research activity has been carried out in
the contest of two research projects: OR.C.HE.S.T.R.A. and S2 −Move.
1.1 The Context of the work
According to the latest directives of the European Commission, several initiatives have
started to support research projects for the Smart Cities and Social Innovation, having
as main objective the development of software applications, the re–qualification and the
technological innovation of urban areas relying on the modern Information and Commu-
nication Technology, now spread everywhere. Nowadays, there are more than four billion
mobile devices forming a wireless network of sensors, thirty billion of RFID, ten billion
devices equipped with chips and sensors able to exchange a paramount amount of informa-
tion in real time. All this information can be processed and aggregated in different ways,
so to provide added value applications exposing functionalities hardly delivered by mono-
lithic applications that can be easily consumed by users satisfying their requests. The
research activity has been carried out within the scope of two research projects (P.O.N.)
funded by the MIUR, OR.C.HE.S.T.R.A. and S2-Move, whose common objective is to
increase the diffusion and the utilization of the modern technologies of information and
communication in urban areas, in order to provide Service Based Applications (SBA)
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aimed not only to improve the liveable level of such areas, but also to be able to provide
such applications in an “intelligent manner”, so to satisfy users’ requests, also with respect
to the requested quality of the provision, known as the Quality of Service (QoS) of the
application. In order to reach this objective, it is necessary to adopt software technologies
able to address the dynamic nature of the provision of these applications, in a realistic
market of service, that characterize the Smart Cities reference scenario of this work. Of
course, the work will only focus on ad hoc designed SBAs, even though the applications
domains for SBAs that can be provided to the public range from the health domain, to
the fruition of Cultural Heritage, urban mobility, just to report only a subset of the ones
more relevant and addressed by the research community.
1.2 The addressed problem
An efficient use of the ICT nowadays available, allows to develop Service Based Applica-
tions designed to manage, analyse, and spread the enormous amount of data available on
the Web, through the innovative technological infrastructures available. These applica-
tions process big volumes of heterogeneous data gathered from different types of available
sources in real time such as: sensors, tablets, smartphones, control units.
In the context of Smart Cities, it is crucial to be able to integrate different plat-
forms and different applications available on the Internet to develop services useful for
the public, for the tourism, for the Public Administration to manage the needs of users
communities (e.g. mobility, security, and so on). It is well known that these types of
applications are composed of different and autonomous services, so providing added value
applications that single monolithic solutions may be unable to provide. In the present
work it is assumed that distributed services are developed according to well–established
standards [68] that guarantee their interoperability, a fundamental request for composing
SBAs. The evolution of the Internet towards the Internet of the Future, is leading to
the transition from a document-centric approach to a service-centric approach, requiring
that services are characterized not only by the functionality they provide, but also by
the quality of the provision in terms of performance, cost, reliability, and so on. These
parameters are usually referred as Quality of Service parameters, and their values may
differ from one service to another, even if they provide the same functionality. So, once
interoperability and communication between autonomous and independent services is pos-
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sible, it is necessary to develop methodologies that allow for the automatic composition
of services by taking into account the variability and dynamism of events occurring in a
realistic market of services such as the one offered by the Smart Cities. In this work, it is
proposed to extend the representation of a service, so allowing for the implementation of a
“smart behaviour” able to cope with the dynamic provision of services according to users
requests characterized also by a required QoS level of satisfaction. The problem addressed
in this work is to design a middleware software mechanism that can be integrated in the
development of SBAs to automatically compose services with a goal:
1. to provide SBAs satisfying users requests both from a functional and non-functional
(QoS) point of view
2. to allow for the provision of a service also when there are QoS requirements con-
flicting with the QoS provided.
1.3 Our Solution
The Service Oriented Computing (SOC) approach to programming allows for the devel-
opment of SBAs starting from the composition of network-available services rather than
building new applications from scratch to accomplish a task. A service is a program-
matically available application logic exposed over the Internet [53] that is not subject to
a centralized control, and it is independently developed from the others. The approach
proposed in this work is to model a Smart City as a market where providers and con-
sumers interact to reach their own objectives: the first ones to provide their services in
order to get a profit (in the most general sense), and the second ones to obtain a com-
position of such services delivering the application, sometimes complex, they require that
satisfies also their requirements in terms of global QoS (end-to-end requirements). The
characterizing features of multi–agent systems make them a suitable approach to model
SBAs providers and consumers, so allowing the simulation of their interactions through
the use of advanced methodologies to automate the composition process of an application
that should satisfy specific QoS requirements. Among these methodologies, automated
software agent negotiation is widely recognized as a suitable mechanism to implement
market-based interactions such as the ones considered in this work. The work carried
out confirms that negotiation can be adopted as a useful mechanism to help finding a
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solution both for the problem of the dynamic composition of QoS–aware SBAs, and for
the problem of accommodating conflicting interests w.r.t. the considered QoS parameters
when providing services for the mobility in urban areas (parking solutions). For the first
problem, automated an automated negotiation mechanism is proposed as the possibility
to find, if successful, a selection of services that once aggregated provide the required
application with the required (or at least acceptable) QoS values, assuming that in a re-
alistic market of services, it is likely that more services providing the same functionality,
but with different QoS values may be available. Agent bidding strategies that model the
providers behaviour when providing their services have been designed and their adoption
in the context of service composition is simulated and analyses. In addition, the mapping
of these strategies when dealing with single-issue, or multi–issues negotiation is investi-
gated together with the possibility to find near optimal agreements also when dealing with
service composition. For the second problem, it is shown how automated negotiation can
be used to model a Decision Support System helping users to select a solution to their
problem also when their QoS requirements are in conflict with the ones offered by the
providers of the composed service they require. The application domain chosen for the
development of the mechanism is the Smart Parking for a Smart City.
1.4 Innovative Aspects
The proposed bidding strategies for an automated negotiation process based on a Gaussian
distribution function represent an original contribution of this work. It is shown how
the adoption of such strategies can be easily used to model different negotiation types
with the same negotiation framework in terms of protocols and strategies. Furthermore,
the approach is distributed since negotiation occurring with different providers can be
carried out concurrently, so addressing the problem of the negotiation cost crucial for
SBAs. The adopted negotiation protocol allows to address many of the requirements of
negotiation for service composition. An evaluation of the negotiation trends in different
market configurations, is reported to show the pros and cons of its use. In addition,
the same negotiation mechanism equipped with a different set of negotiation strategies is
proposed to support drivers to select a parking space in the city of Naples, according to
both their requirements in term of cost and location, but also the requirements of parking
vendors and city regulation needs (sometimes unforeseen and conflicting with the drivers
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ones). This approach results an innovative use of negotiation to model a support decision
system. A prototype of this Smart Parking system has been implemented and shown as
a demo at the ”PAAMS 2014” international conference.
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Chapter 2
Basic Concepts
This chapter provides an overview on the technologies used in this PhD is based. In
section 2.1 we introduce the Service Oriented Computing (SOC) paradigm, and in section
2.2 a brief introduction to of Multi–Agent Systems. Finally, we introduce concepts related
to Automated Negotiation mechanisms.
2.1 Service Oriented Computing
Service-Oriented Computing (SOC) is the computing paradigm that utilizes services as
fundamental elements for developing applications/solutions. Services are self describing,
platform-agnostic computational elements that support rapid, low-cost composition of dis-
tributed applications.[52]
The paradigm of Service Oriented Computing is based on the abstract concept of
service. A service is any software entity self contained with a specific functionality, able to
communicate through well-defined protocols that allow interoperability between different
software systems. In such way, service’s functionalities may be offered by service providers
to different systems over internet. For this reason, to satisfy these requirements services
should be the following features described in [52]:
• Technology neutral : they must be invocable through standardized lowest common
denominator technologies that are available to almost all IT environments. This im-
plies that the invocation mechanisms (protocols, descriptions and discovery mecha-
nisms) should comply with widely accepted standards.
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• Loosely coupled : they must not require knowledge or any internal structures or
conventions (context) at the client or service side.
• Support location transparency : services should have their definitions and location
information stored in a repository and be accessible by a variety of clients that can
locate and invoke the services irrespective of their location.
A service can be simple and composed of a collection of exiting services that can
communicate with each other. Communications may take place both in the data trans-
mission and in the coordination of the activities of two or more services. Service Based
Applications are developed composing services, allowing the definition of complex busi-
ness processes. The services used to build SBAs are offered by providers that implement
and provide their maintenance.
Hence, Service Oriented Computing approach (SOC) allows the development of SBA,
obtained by composition of the network-available services, encouraging reuse of existing
services rather than developing new applications from scratch to accomplish a complex
task.
Normally, these services are provided by different suppliers, and for this reason there is
the need to define standard protocols widely shared to ensure their interoperability. In this
context, the industry is very interested in the relevance and benefits of such technology.
Hence, they defined protocols for describing the ways on which services can interact [14].
Consortia promoting these standards protocols are mainly two W3C (World Wide Web
Consortium) and OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information
Standards).
BPEL (Business Process Execution Language) is a language that describes business pro-
cesses formally through the activities, so it identifies actors and the tasks for which
they are responsible. BPEL allows to specify the set of actions within sequential
structures, conditionals, loops, and parallel. BPEL is a standard OASIS [50].
WSDL (Web Services Description Language) language is used to describe the high-level
functionality of the service, in the standard XML. It is used within the SOA, with
the communication protocol SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol), which deals
with the exchange of messages without giving any information about the type of
messages exchanged. The task of the WSDL is to describe the type of messages
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exchanged by the web service, the access point and the interface with which the
service can exchange messages. WSDL is a standard W3C [66].
SOAP/RESTful There are two main ways for developing services: the traditional
SOAP Web service and conceptually simpler, RESTful Web services. SOAP Web
service is based on three important standardization initiatives: WSDL document
that describes the protocol bindings and message formats; SOAP is a protocol for
exchanging structured information in XML format; UDDI a register to locate web
services. RESTful Web services use the REST model, in which services are identified
by URIs, which offer a global addressing space for resource and service discovery.
RESTful Web services interact through a uniform interface, which comprises a fixed
set of operations in the context of the Web and the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP): GET, PUT, DELETE and POST [61].
2.1.1 Service Based Applications
The creation process of new services, as described, that leverage the reuse of existing
services, is a more complex procedure with respect to a simple correlation between selected
web services. In fact, the development of web services providing an add value has to follow
three processes: composition, discovery and selection.
Composition is a process by which it is defined, in an abstract description, the de-
pendencies of activities, which together reach a certain business goal. An activity is a
functionality that contributes to the achievement of the overall objective. The depen-
dences among activities are defined specifying the structure of the workflow of services is
based on some fundamental constructs that determine the relationships between activities,
such as:
sequential: activities are carried out one after the other, and an activity is only activated
at the end of a previous;
parallel (AND split): after the end of an activity, multiple tasks in parallel are launched;
conditional (OR split): at the end of an activity, one of the other possible activity is
initiated, specifying the start up conditions for the activities or the choice could be
made by a non deterministic process;
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join (AND/OR): to continue in the process instantiation of the workflow, all previous
activity (case AND), or at least one of the previous activities (OR) must be com-
pleted;
loop: activities are iterated in their execution by specifying the conditions of termination
of the iteration.
2.1.2 Quality of Services
In many cases, it is useful to have qualitative information of the selected services. In
fact, it may happen that equivalent functionality are provided with different values of not
functional parameters, i.e. parameters that are related to how a service is offered and not
to the functionality that it provides.
This kind of information is the quality of service (QoS) and belongs to the category
of non-functional characteristics of the service [44, 37, 45].
Moreover, a user can request that a service is composed with specific values of not
functional parameters. In this hypothesis, the service compositor has to make its own
choices by analysing the parameter not functional values of services, selecting one for
each activity. This is a complex task for a service compositor because it cannot simply
choose a generic web service compatible for each abstract service, but it has to evaluate
the requests and market supply.
The concept of quality of service depend on the context in which it is used because for
the estimation of the quality, in some contexts, some parameters may be more influential
than others. In general, the parameters used for the evaluation of the quality of a service
are the following:
• cost - the amount that a service requester needs to pay to execute the service;
• time - the execution time between the requests sent and results received;
• reliability - the ability of a service to function correctly and consistently;
• availability - the probability that the service is ready to be invoked;
• performance - related to the service response time and latency;
• security - related to confidentiality and access control aspects.
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The concept of quality of service can be extended to the composed application that is
the result of a service composition. In the literature, this value is referred as the global
or total QoS. The value of a QoS global parameter is related to the value of the QoS
parameters of the invoked individual services, when an operation is performed by the
application. This means that the function for the calculation of this value is influenced
by the following factors:
1. the nature of the parameter taken into account and the metric used to measure the
value;
2. the internal structure of the application, i.e., how the services are composed.
In fact, let us consider two applications composed with the same services, but in a different
way, where: the first application invokes two services in a sequential way, whereas the
second invokes them in parallel. In this scenario, the cost for the transaction is the same
for both applications, and is equal to the sum of the costs of individual services. The
time, however, is different for each application. In the first case time is equal to the sum
of the response time of the individual service. In the second case, instead, time is equal to
the maximum response time of the two services because they are invoked independently
of each other.
The level of abstraction of Service Oriented Computing paradigm, and the indepen-
dence from service providers, make it plausible to imagine scenarios in which there are
more services available with the same functionality. This could happen either with differ-
ent suppliers providing equivalent services, or with the same provider offering the same
service with different levels and quality parameters.
A scenario like this opens for the possibility to specify constraints and/or simple
preferences for the parameters of quality of the application or activity, thus, requiring
that the composite application complies with them. The goal, then, is the selection of a
service for each activity, in order to meet all the constraints, getting as close as possible
to the preferences.
2.2 Multi-Agent Systems
Multi–agent systems are a viable approach in this direction allowing handling sophisti-
cated interaction patterns. Agent-orientation is an appropriate design paradigm to enable
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automatic and dynamic collaborations, especially for e-Business systems with complex and
distributed transactions.
Software Agents paradigm is used to model independent and heterogeneous entities,
with different objectives potentially conflicting with each other that act autonomously in
dynamic environments. By the definition of software agents given in [71]:
“Agents are computer systems with two important capabilities. First, they are at least
to some extent capable of autonomous action of deciding for themselves what they need
to do in order to satisfy their design objectives. Second, they are capable of interacting
with other agents not simply by exchanging data, but by engaging in analogues of the kind
of social activity that we all engage in every day of our lives: cooperation, coordination,
negotiation, and the like.”
Software agents are programs that execute operations autonomously, on their behalf,
and more generally they are able to plan the actions to do, in order to reach goals or tasks
for which they are designed. The main features and behavior that a generic software agent
should have, are defined in [72]:
• autonomy : an agent operates without human supervision and it has some kind of
control over his own actions, and on its internal state;
• reactivity : agents perceive their environment (which could be the physical environ-
ment, a user that acts to through a graphical interface, a collection of other software
agents, internet) and respond promptly to its changes;
• proactivity : agents act not only in response to their environment, but they are able
to take initiatives, performing actions guided by their objective.
• social ability : agents interact with other agents and humans through some defined
protocol.
Another feature that should be of interest for developing the agents, is the software
rationality [72], which can be summarized as the assumption that an agent will act with
the aim to achieve its goals and will not act so to impede the achievement of its objectives,
at least to the extent that its representation of the state of the world allows. In reaching
their targets, rational agents try to maximize their own utility. The utility is a function
where the domain is the set of all possible states of the environment, and the co-domain
Real numbers, indicating the preference level of the agent on each state of the world:
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u : S → <
In this representation the agent will prefer the state s1 to the state s2 if and only if
u(s1) > u(s2). An agent is defined as self-interested [71], if it has its own preferences on the
possible states of the world, and it acts in an attempt to achieve the most preferred states.
Usually, states of the world which are preferred by an agent, could be also preferred by
other agents. This means that in order to achieve these states, the agent should enumerate
all reachable states as a result of one of its possible actions, taking into account also the
other agents. This computation can be too complex when one considers that the agent’s
memory and computational capacity are limited. For this reason, in real applications
often the agents have bounded rationality, i.e. they try to maximize their utility under
simplified models of the world.
An environment where the agents interact with each other is called a multi-agent
system (MAS). In this context, each agent needs a further feature, namely the ability to
interact with other agents in the same environment (social ability), using a certain type
of communication language [71]. The most common mechanisms of interaction between
software agents are:
• mechanisms of coordination which coordinate their actions;
• mechanisms for cooperation, to achieve common goals by distributing the workload
or exploiting the specific capabilities of each agent.
2.3 Automated Negotiation
In multi-agent systems automated negotiation is used to model the process of decision
making to reach an agreement that meets the constraints of two or more parties in the
presence conflicting interests. The conflict of interest refers to the fact that agents have
conflicting interests, as in the case that occurs between a seller and buyer. As described
in [32], automated negotiation is essentially a distributed search in the space of potential
agreements between the different negotiators represented by autonomous agents, which
involves the exchange of relevant information and aims to find an agreement that is
acceptable to all participants.
In the following the main features which characterize the automated negotiation are
described:
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• Negotiation Protocol is the set of rules that govern the interaction and defines who
are the actors of the negotiation, the states that characterize a trade (for example,
when a negotiation has begins or ends), the events that determine the change of
actors’ status, and messages that can be sent by the actors in a particular state.
• Negotiation Object is identified by the set of parameter values which must be reached
for an agreement, known as Agenda [23]. To dynamically change the agenda by
adding or removing parameters may be allowed by the protocol.
• Bidding Strategies (model of decision making agent) can be defined formally as an
apparatus which allows the agent to determine the content of the action that it will
perform consistently with the protocol. In general, for a given set of negotiation
protocol there are many strategies compatible with it, each of which can determine
a different action. This means that a strategy can work well with a given protocol,
but does not work with others. So, the choice of strategy depends on the protocol
in use and by the trading scenario.
The negotiation protocol and negotiation strategies define the negotiation mechanism
[39]. The following is a summary of the properties that characterize the design of a
negotiation mechanism:
• Computational Efficiency : the strategy adopted by the agent must be a rational
output within a reasonable time, i.e. an offer that corresponds to a high expected
utility;
• Efficiency in communication: the exchange of messages between agents must take
place in a reasonable time and limiting the overload in the message processing for
each agent;
• Individual Rationality : an agent participates in the negotiation only if it is in its
interests.
• Pareto efficiency : the output of the negotiation is Pareto efficient, if there is no
other outcome that increases the utility of an agent, without there is another agent
that gets worse in its utility.
In the design of the negotiation mechanism, it is difficult to get the satisfaction of
all properties; for this reason, it is necessary to make a trade-off between the properties
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described above. The size of the space of potential agreements is determined by the struc-
ture of the object of negotiation, where each parameter is associated with a dimension.
Each proposal corresponds to a point of the space of potential agreements. Each agent
is associated with a region of space that defines the points of agreement, or the points at
which it can accept the offer. For each point, it is given a preference by a private utility
function. An agreement is possible if the intersection of these regions defined for each
agent is not empty.
The ability to produce and respond to a proposal must be specific to an agent who
negotiates. In particular, each agent must be able to:
1. propose a possible point of agreement;
2. respond to a proposal indicating whether it is acceptable or not.
There are other ways to make the negotiation, in which the agents are also able
to provide feedback on the proposals received (Argumentation). A feedback can be a
comment on the values of the parameters or a counter-proposal that is an alternative
proposal generated in response to the received offer. From this feedback, the bidder
will be able to generate an offer, which takes into account the specific requests made by
the buyer. In competitive environments, where there are agents that compete to supply
the same service albeit with different QoS, the strategies should be private. This factor
affects the efficiency of the protocol. In fact, if strategies are more like to be private,
agents do not know how the deals are generated during trading, and so they are not able
to determine beforehand the space of shared agreement. So, agents can start negotiating
although there is no point of agreement. On the other hand, an agent that reveals its
strategy, gives up to maximize the gain in utility (negotiator’s dilemma [65]).
In this section, the main characteristics that must be considered in the design of a
mechanism for automated negotiation are described in details. As previously outlined,
the number of interactions in the negotiation depends on the number of involved agents,
and on their characteristics, as well as on the object of the negotiation. Moreover, it is
important to identify the most suitable negotiation protocol, so that it is able to satisfy
the properties such as: computational efficiency, communication efficiency, individual
rationality, Pareto efficiency.
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2.3.1 Bidding Strategies
Each agent that participates in a negotiation should have a role. In most domains the set
of roles is clear and it is reduced to a couple: seller, buyer. There are also domains where
there is another role the Mediator, which has the task of mediating between buyers and
sellers to accelerate the timing of negotiations, and to find a solution that is optimal for
all agents involved in bargaining.
The cognitive abilities of each agent is based on a model of decision making, i.e. the
degree of knowledge on the object traded and the strategies of the other agents. The
social skills of the agent determine whether the agent is acting as an individual entity
with private interests and/or as a collaborative entity with the other agents. The model of
decision making allows the agent to: make an offer, reject the proposal of the other agents,
formulate a possible counter proposal, accept an offer and leave the trading. Moreover,
this model describes how to calculate the values of the parameters to be offered.
In [22] the main models of decision making are described: responsive decision making,
and deliberative decision making.
The responsive mechanisms
The responsive mechanisms shape a reactive behavior to a number of environmental fac-
tors. These mechanisms generate offers from the linear combination of simple decay
functions, called tactics, where each function models a pattern of concessions, which indi-
cates how a counteroffer is generated, i.e. decreasing the utility of the proposal made in
the previous negotiation interaction. In other words, the agents make a discount on their
total utility, giving up the utility maximum and encouraging the other party to accept
the offer.
Since it depends on the type of trading and conditions that are created, it can be
convenient to use a tactic rather than another. The tactics are made taking into account
conflicting interests between the seller and buyer agents. These tactics can be divided
into the following groups: time dependent, resource dependent, imitative.
Time–dependent: if an agent has a time deadline1 by which it must reach an agreement.
These tactics model the offer of an agent that concedes when approaches to the
1Deadline is the maximum time within which the thread of negotiation must end. Timeout is the
maximum time available for each agent to generate an offer or counteroffer.
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deadline of negotiations. Therefore, this tactic is a function time–dependent and
belongs at the following subgroups of functions (Boulware and Conceder tactics.).
• Boulware: tactic keeps the value of the offers close to the initial one in the
initial rounds. While, if the agent approaches to the deadline, it makes great
concessions in utilities, in order to reach an agreement, providing offers near
its reservation value, which represents the value lower in utility that can be
offered by the agent;
• Conceder: The agent, at the beginning of negotiation, in utility, making quickly
offers that come close to the reservation offer.
Resource–dependent: these tactics model the pressure to reach an agreement depend-
ing on the available resources remaining. The functions of this set are similar to
those of the previous group except that the domain of the function is now the amount
of resource available. The difference with the time dependent tactics resides in the
fact that the time is growing, while the number of resources have a performance that
is not linearly related with time. Therefore, they may use functions which estimate
the change in the number of resources on the basis of how many potential buyers of
the resource are negotiating.
Imitative: describes the agents that reach agreement using imitative tactics, where the
counteroffer depends on the behavior of the other party in the negotiation. The
tactics of this family depend on the behavior of the counterparty and how it is
imitated. There are three sub-groups of tactics:
• Tit-For-Tat relative: for a given parameter, the agent gives a counteroffer in
the same proportion of concession of the counter–party.
• Tit-For-Tat absolute: for a given parameter, the agent gives a counteroffer in
the same amount of concession of the counter–party.
• Tit-For-Tat average: given a time window the average concession made by the
other party is evaluated, and that amount is the concession made by the agent
in the counteroffer.
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Figure 2.1: Boulware and Conceder tactics.
Deliberative mechanisms
Deliberative mechanisms are used when the object of negotiation is represented as com-
bination of multi–parameters. They try to make the offer more attractive to the other
party, without reducing in terms of utility, unlike responsive mechanisms that allow to
concede in utility in iterative manner until the agreement is reached. Hence, deliberative
mechanisms are designed with the objective of obtaining results that are closer to be
Pareto optimal. Such mechanisms do not discriminate the offers by the utility values cor-
responding to the individual parameters, but through the utility value of the whole offer.
These mechanisms, are divided into mechanisms of trade-off, and issue set manipulation
[22].
Trade–off mechanism generates deals changing the values of attributes offered in the
previous round without concession in terms of utility. In other words, a new bid
is calculated by varying the values of the individual issue, but the utility remains
unchanged.
Issue–set–manipulation mechanism has as objective to increase the probability of an
agreement by adding and removing parameters to the offer. So, the structure of
the negotiation object is dynamically altered. This strategy allows to restrict or
increase the region where the point of agreement is searched.
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2.3.2 Negotiation object
The object of negotiation can be characterized by a single parameter or multiple param-
eters. In the first case, the utility is closely related to the value assumed by the single
parameter. In the second case, the object of the negotiation is composed by multiple
parameters. To calculate the utility of an offer, these parameters must be in some way
aggregated. Furthermore, in the case of multiple attributes there is the need to take into
account the exponential growth of the space of potential agreements. In defining a ne-
gotiation, the set of parameters on which agents negotiate must be determined, together
with the trading process, i.e., how to negotiate the values of the parameters. In [23], three
ways to negotiate on multiple parameters are classified.
Package–deal: in the offer a value for each parameter is proposed. The parameters are
dependent on each other, that is the value of a given parameter depends on the
values of the other parameters contained in the offer.
Issue–by–issue: each offer contains the value of a single parameter, negotiating param-
eter by parameter an agreement is reached. In this procedure, the agents must also
decide the order of parameters into the negotiation, also in this case, the parameter
value depends on the others.
Simultaneous: similar to the package deal, but the parameters are independent, as if
there are copies of the agent that negotiate independently on single parameter.
2.3.3 Negotiation Protocol
In order for heterogeneous agents to collaborate through a negotiation mechanism, there
is the need of a defined standardized protocol, shared by all agents, in which a set of rules
that characterize the negotiation, and the specifications of the exchanged messages format
are described. For this reason, in 1996 was found a Swiss not-for-profit organization, the
Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA), with the aim of defining a full set of
standard rules for both implementing agent-based systems, specifying how agents should
communicate and inter–operate in a standard way with each other [24].
FIPA has defined different kinds of negotiation protocols that describe the most com-
mon interactions between agents. The protocol defines the roles, messages and interactions
models for the definition of a contract to supply of a good.
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Another point characterizing the negotiation protocol, is the number of agents involved
in the negotiation that is a measure of the trading complexity. The type of communication
that can be established between the agents defined in the negotiation protocol, can be of
three types:
one–by–one: in which two agents which negotiate with one another are involved. Typ-
ically, an agent is the seller and the other is the buyer of a good.
one–to–many: a single agent negotiates with many agents. An example are auctions,
where the auctioneer sells an asset to the highest bidder, among all the agents who
make an offer.
many–to–many: in which agents negotiate with each other simultaneously. In the worst
case each agent is involved in negotiating with the others.
In the following, the most used the negotiation protocol defined by FIPA, Iterated
Contract Net Interaction Protocol (ICNIP) in [24] is described.
Iterated Contract Net Interaction Protocol
The FIPA ICNIP [24] identified two main roles: initiator, participant. The agent who
assumes the role of initiator is the agent that has an interest in receiving the supply of a
good (Buyer), while the participant is a potential providers of the good (Seller). Mainly,
two messages between initiator and participant are exchanged, offers and counteroffers.
The flow of interaction, as represented in 2.2, is composed of five phases.
1. the initiator sends a Call for Proposals (CFP) to participants involved in the nego-
tiation, specifying the goods requested and the terms of the contract for the supply.
2. each participant analyzes the CFP and, according to its strategies, makes its own
proposal.
3. the initiator chooses participants who have sent the best deals, and sends them a
message of acceptance for the supply contract of the good.
4. the initiator send a rejection message to the remaining participants.
5. once completed the provision of the good, the participant sends a message to the
initiator with the outcome of the supply.
2.3. AUTOMATED NEGOTIATION 31
Figure 2.2: FIPA Iterated Contract Net Interaction Protocol [24].
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ICNIP adopts an iterative process of offers negotiation, in which, after stage two, the
initiator may decide to respond with a counteroffer. This iteration process can continue
until one experiences one of following conditions:
• the initiator accepts one or more proposals (Agreement);
• all participants send a message of rejection;
• the initiator sends a message of rejection to all participant.
The protocol also allows to mark the exchanged messages in a thread of negotiation
with a unique identifier, allowing agents to establish a history of negotiation and to
define strategies based on the past behavior of the agents during interaction. Moreover,
ICNIP supports multi–round negotiation, where increases the chances of reaching an
agreement with respect to the basic version, which offers a simple exchange of single offer
and counteroffer.
2.3.4 Different approaches to negotiation
Once analysed the basic elements of the automated negotiation and the features to be con-
sidered in its design, in the following there is a classification [32] of the various approaches
to automatic trading presenting briefly.
2.3.4.1 Game theory
Game theory studies the interactions between self-interested agents, and for this reason
it is considered into the negotiation context. The aim of this model is the pursuit of the
best action that an agent can do in a given state of the environment, or that maximizes
its utility function.
In order to determine the best action, the agent should think in a strategic way, i.e.
foreseeing the next action, taking into account the actions carried out previously by the
opponent, it is assumed that the other agent will always select the action that maximizes
its own function utility. Once the negotiation scenario is defined, game theory can be
applied to design the negotiation protocol and the strategy that the agent will use to
maximize its utility function. An example of negotiation based on game theory is the
monotonic concession protocol adopting the strategy Zeuthen [59].
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The negotiation protocol between two agents, consists of a sequence of rounds and
in each round, each agent sends a proposal. If the proposal made by an agent matches
or exceeds the one made by the other agent in terms of utility, it is accepted and the
negotiation ends, otherwise it proceeds with the next round, in which agents can make
a concession or send the previous offer. If neither of the agents makes a concession, the
negotiation ends without success.
If agents are to use this type of protocol to negotiate, a possible strategy that they
may adopt is the strategy of Zeuthen:
• concessions are determined by the willingness to risk a conflict. An agent will be
more willing to risk the failure of the negotiation, if the difference in utility between
the current bid and conflict deal is low. Conversely, if this difference is high, the
agent will be less inclined to risk and therefore more inclined to concede;
• the agent gives the minimum in order to avoid failure of the negotiations, so that
in the next round the other agent have to concede.
2.3.4.2 Heuristics Methods
These methods, unlike game theory, address the problem of computational cost arising
from determining the best possible offer. Indeed, a non exhaustive search in the space of
the agreements is made, producing a solution acceptable rather than rationally excellent.
This technique, therefore, has the great advantage, with respect to the one defined by game
theory, to be based on realistic, assumptions, and therefore applicable to real domains. An
example of a heuristic model is the set of mechanisms responsive and deliberative. In such
instances, it is not possible to calculate the risk factor of the counterpart, and therefore
it is not possible, as in Zeuthen strategy for game theory, to calculate the minimum
concession that prevents the failure of the negotiation.
The mechanisms adopting a heuristic approach have the following disadvantages:
• allow to find a solution sub–optimally since, the entire space of possible outcomes
is not fully examined;
• require an empirical analysis and simulations to be evaluated, since it is impossible
to predict precisely how the system and agents will behave in each situation.
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2.3.4.3 Argumentation
The idea of the argumentation is to extend communication between the agents involved in
the negotiation, allowing the exchange of a wider set of information about the objects of
negotiation. This information can be of different type and is called arguments [34]. They
are exchanged between the agents in order to provide more information to the rejected
offers, providing the reasons why the proposal was not accepted.
Similarly, the agent can provide with its proposal, argumentation indicating the reason
why the other party should accept the offer. The exchange of argumentations gives the
possibility to agents to make more explicit the respective regions of agreement, accelerat-
ing the trading process.
Moreover, this model allows the agent, to alter the preference of the counterpart
through threats or the promise of rewards. Therefore, one agent may change the re-
gion of agreement, based on information that is not directly related to the object of the
negotiation, but the representation of the environment of the agent preferences.
Models based on the argumentation are much more complex than the heuristic models
and game theory based. Indeed, they require a process for evaluating, generation and
selection of the argumentation, and this process leads to a further computational load for
an agent.
Chapter 3
Negotiation for Smart Service
Composition
This work is aimed at designing a computational mechanism automate to the composition
of services in the context of Smart Cities. In particular, the research was carried out within
the research project OR.C.HE.S.T.R.A. in which we investigated the use of software
negotiation to compose services.
The main task of OR.C.HE.S.T.R.A. (ORganization of Cultural HEritage and Smart
Tourism and Real-time Accessibility) project is to realize a platform for tourists and
citizens that offers a set of solutions oriented for the intelligent enhancement of cul-
tural heritage in Naples, with the aim to make the city smart, sustainable and green.
This project addresses several problems, for example: the identification of the touristic
itineraries, the analysis to model tourism flow, and the development of a monitoring sys-
tem for mobility. Hence, the OR.C.HE.S.T.R.A. project is based on the realization of an
intelligent multimedia platform that is able to reprocess the information present in the
city, in order to offer these information as services with added value for the city, providing
smart solutions for citizens and tourists. For this reason, it is crucial for the project the
development of software technologies able to address the dynamic nature of the provision
of these applications, that characterize the Smart Cities.
In the following section, we will present our automated negotiation mechanisms adopted
for composition of Service Based Applications to provide applications satisfying users re-
quests.
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Figure 3.1: The composition process.
3.1 QoS-aware Service Composition
The service composition process, as described in section 2.1, usually starts from an ab-
stract representation of a composition request, we refer to as an Abstract Workflow (AW ).
A simple representation of an AW, also known as the workflow structure [76], is a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) AW = (AS, P ) where AS = AS1, . . . , ASn is a set of nodes, and P
is a set of directed arcs. A DAG–based workflow structure contains sequence, parallelism,
and choice patterns, but not loops or cycles.
Each node represents an Abstract Service (ASi), i.e. a service description that specifies
a required functionality. Each directed arc that connects two nodes represent a precedence
relation among the corresponding ASs. A precedence relation p = (ASi, ASj) of P implies
that an instance of the Abstract Service ASj cannot start its execution until an instance
of the abstract service ASi finishes its execution due to a dependence relation between
ASi and ASj.
In order to provide a required SBA, each ASi in the AW have to be bounded to
a concrete service (we will refer to just as service), i.e. a Web service implementing
the functionality specified by the corresponding ASi. In our cases of studies services are
provided by different agents, and they may be characterized by quality attributes referring
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to the service non–functional characteristics Quality of Services (QOS).
It is becoming of vital importance to take into account the value of QoS attributes when
selecting services to provide an executable workflow, since different customers requiring an
SBA may have different expectations and requirements on its end–to–end QoS values. In
fact, when requiring SBAs users specify their QoS preferences at the workflow level rather
than at service level since they are usually not involved in the service composition process,
so they are not aware of how to split a global preference at the level of single services. In
order to evaluate the end–to–end quality values of an SBA, aggregation functions have
to be defined for the components attributes, and these functions depend on the nature of
the considered attributes, and on the workflow structure.
One step of the service composition process is to identify the optimal service selection
to meet the user’s QoS requirements [77]. In general, service selection can be modeled
as a Multi–dimension Multi–choice Knapsack Problem (MMKP), which is known to be
an NP–hard problem [2]. Exact solutions require a long-time computations for large
problems, so heuristics approaches are necessary [30].
By the way, optimization–based approaches consider that the provider’s offered values
for service QoS attributes are pre–determined and not customizable, but this is unlikely
in the context of a dynamic market of services. In fact, the dynamic nature of Web
services, and their provision on the Internet–based market of services, require to make
the following assumptions:
• the user’s QoS requirements are usually expressed as end–to–end requirements on
the whole SBA, and they may change according to dynamic market demand–supply
conditions,
• the set of services available may change in time,
• the QoS values of services may change according to market demand–supply mech-
anisms,
• the dynamic nature of QoS values makes not possible to advertise these values to
users at the application design–time.
These assumptions make global optimization–based approaches, as the ones proposed in
[6, 78, 80] unfeasible in our scenario. For this reason, in this work a negotiation–based
approach allowing to consider flexible and negotiable QoS attribute values, is adopted.
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In our approach, it is assumed that service providers are modeled as software agents,
we refer to as Service Providers (SPs), negotiating with a Service Compositor agent (SC)
acting on behalf of a user. Negotiation is used for the dynamic selection of the SPs able
to provide services whose QoS values, once aggregated, fulfill the user’s QoS preferences
that represent end–to–end constraints on the entire application.
Software agents are a natural way to represent service providers and consumers and
their defining characteristics are essential to realize the full potential of service-oriented
systems [25]. Software agents are autonomous problem solving entities, situated in an
environment, able to reach their own objectives and to respond to the uncertainty of the
environment they operate in, and they are equipped with flexible decision making capa-
bilities [33]. These characteristics make software agents a useful computational paradigm
to model respectively providers that offer services at given conditions, and consumers that
require services at other, sometimes conflicting, conditions.
Providers and consumers, interacting according to specified protocols and interfaces,
have to establish their agreed conditions to respectively provide and consume services.
Software agent automated negotiation is one of the approaches adopted for reaching agree-
ments, so it can be used to select services in a service composition.
3.1.1 Negotiation Requirements for Service Composition
Negotiation usually takes place between two agents willing to come to an agreement on
conflicting interests [32]. Most approaches in service composition that use negotiation
mechanisms for each required service independently from the others relying on bilateral
one–to–one negotiation mechanisms [62, 54].
In these cases, negotiation models used are of the type one–to–many in which the
object of negotiation, is characterized by multiple attributes that represent the QoS pa-
rameters. In particular, one–to–many negotiation is constituted by a set of bilateral
negotiations, one–to–one, not independent. A single element of this set of bilateral ne-
gotiations defines a thread of negotiation, in which offers and counteroffers are generated
from the tactics as defined by the agent. Each negotiation thread is characterized by
alternating offers and counteroffers, which continues as long as an agreement is achieved,
or the negotiation ends due to is reached the deadline of negotiation begins reached.
In our approach negotiation is used to dynamically select the Service Providers that
offer services with suitable QoS attribute values, but it is assumed that all the agents
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offering services are involved in the negotiation process.
Hence, given an AW composed of n ASs (with n ≥ 2), and k SPs (with k ≥ 1) for
each of the n ASs in the composition, the number of potential negotiating agents may
vary from n+ 1 to n ∗ k + 1 agents, where 1 SC agent is in charge of finding the optimal
selection of SPs, according to the QoS user’s constraints, to instantiate each AS. Hence,
the negotiation is necessarily one–to–many.
In order to prepare an offer xti at negotiation round t, a service provider agent i uses
a set of negotiation strategies to generate values for each negotiated issue [32]. Of course,
agents must be equipped with algorithms to evaluate the received and proposed offers.
The value of a specific offer is represented in terms of agent utility. Hence, the utility Ui




Usually in SBA negotiation the strategies and utility functions adopted by the provider
agents are private information. In fact, when SBAs are provided in an open, dynamic
and competitive market of services, it is not realistic to assume that their strategies are
shared. Furthermore, these strategies may change depending on the market demand–
supply trends, so making their shared knowledge unfeasible without causing communi-
cation overheads. For these cases, negotiation mechanisms have to be designed so that
negotiators can come to an agreement even though they have no prior knowledge (complete
or partial) of the utility functions of the other agents involved in the negotiation. Hence,
negotiation occurs in an incomplete information setting where agents utility functions,
reserve values in terms of utilities, and concession strategies are private information.
The communication occurs only between the Service Providers and the Service Com-
positor (SPs offers are not broadcast to all participant negotiators). In addition, also SC
constraints on the QoS of the composition may be private. However, even in the case of
public constrains, SPs are not able to directly evaluate such constraints since they are
not aware of the other offers. The negotiation mechanism allows to establish a sort of
Service Level Agreement (SLA) for QoS-aware SBAs between the SC and the selected
SPs. As already said, in a composition of services, its global value is given by the aggre-
gation of the QoS values, each one provided by a service for each AS. That means that
the offers received by the SC for a single AS cannot be evaluated independently from
the ones received for the other ASs, so a coordination among negotiations for the single
abstract services is necessary. A negotiation mechanism for service composition should
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allow both to negotiate with the SPs providing services for each required functionality
in the AW, and also to evaluate the aggregated QoS value of the received offers. So a
coordination step is necessary. This type of negotiation can be very time–consuming, so
the possibility for the SC to concurrently negotiate with the SPs of each AS at the same
time is advisable. Generally, a buyer obtains more desirable negotiation outcomes when
it negotiates concurrently with all the sellers in competitive situations in which there is
information uncertainty and there is a deadline for the negotiation to complete [4]. The
coordination step occur, at the end of each negotiation iteration, when the SC evaluates
the aggregation of the received offers in order to allow SPs to adjust their successive offers
if an agreement is not reached.
3.1.2 Related work on QoS-aware Service Composition
Several efforts have been carried out in the areas of QoS-based service selection for Service
Based Applications [79]. Some works propose algorithms to select service implementations
relying on the optimization of a weighted sum of global QoS parameters as in [80] by
using Integer Linear Programming (ILP) methods. Nevertheless, ILP-based algorithms
for selecting services are suitable when QoS data are accurate and the problem size is small
(i.e. with a limited number of nodes for the Abstract Workflow and a limited number of
potentially available services for each node) due to the ILP high complexity [78]. In such
cases, instead of optimal solution procedures, heuristic algorithms have been proposed
in the literature [10]. In this context also Genetic Algorithms have been proposed to
address scalability problems as in [12, 38]. Approximation-based approaches are more
efficient than linear approaches as they can handle large number of services better than
linear methods. In [6] local constraints are included in the linear programming model
used to satisfy global QoS constraints. In [3] Mixed Integer Programming is used to find
the optimal decomposition of global QoS constraints into local constraints representing
the service skyline for each service class, so allowing to prune the service candidates that
are not likely to be part of the optimal solution. Typically, these works rely on static
approaches assuming that QoS parameters of each service does not change during the
selection process, i.e. they are predetermined, and focus on optimality and performances
of the provisioning methods. Such approaches do not take into account the possibility to
dynamically change the provided QoS values during the selection process that represents
the basic motivation for the approach proposed in our work.
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Other approaches rely on negotiation mechanisms to select services according to the
QoS values [54, 62]. In most of these approaches negotiation occurs when the service
provider has already been selected, and it negotiates the values of the service parameters it
provides for the service. So, the negotiation process is one-to-one between service requester
and the selected service provider [80]. Other negotiation-based approaches use negotiation
as a mechanism to dynamically select the appropriate the service provider whose provided
services best matches the service requester’s non-functional requirements [27]. But usually
negotiation is carried out for each required service independently from the others. So
negotiation consists of multiple negotiation sub-processes each one associated with one
of the required service. Each negotiation sub-process, in turn, may include multiple
negotiation threads, one for each candidate provider, to choose the best service for the
specific component service.
In this work, we propose a coordinated negotiation mechanism, where negotiations
occur concurrently with all providers of the different required services in the composition.
Coordination occurs at each negotiation steps when the aggregated QoS values offered by
different SPs are collectively evaluated to decide whether to accept or not a set of offers,
so to take into account the dependencies among different negotiation processes because
in a composition of services the attributes values for one services cannot be determined
independently from the other services in the composition.
3.2 One-Sided Negotiation Protocol
The negotiation process between two agents x and y is a bilateral interaction that consists
of an alternate succession of offers and counteroffers. The process continues either until
an offer is accepted by the other agent, or one of the agents terminates the interaction
(e.g., because of a dead-line). An agent x accepts an offer j of y if the value of the utility
the agent x obtains for that offer is greater than the utility value of the counter-offer the
agent x would send back, i.e. Ux(jy(t)) ≥ Ux(jx(t+ 1)) [32].
In order to prepare a counteroffer, an agent uses a set of tactics to generate new values
for each negotiated object [21]. Of course, both agents must be provided with strategies to
formulate offers and counteroffers, and they must be equipped with algorithms to evaluate
the received offers. In this work for service selection, we consider a one-sided iterative
negotiation mechanism allowing only the SPs to formulate new offers, and only the SC to
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evaluate them.
The rationale of this choice is twofold: on one hand it makes it possible to simulate
what happens in a real market of services where an SC does not have enough information
on the SPs strategies to formulate counteroffers; on the other hand it takes into account
that the offers for a single functionality cannot be evaluated independently from the ones
received for the other functionalities. In fact, the proposed negotiation mechanism allows
both to negotiate with the SPs providing services for each required functionality in the
AW, but at the same time, to evaluate the aggregated QoS value of the received offers.
Indeed, the SC is not able to make single counter-proposals with respect to each received
offer because the change of a value of a particular QoS can influence the constraints to be
fulfilled by the QoS of the other services. In other words, negotiating over the attributes of
the single AS cannot be done independently from each other. Since SC does not provide
counteroffers, the negotiation could be modeled simply as an auction mechanism as in
[74].
However, in order to model a real market of services, it cannot be assumed that
providers providing different functionality follow the same rules when bidding (such as
Vickrey, English, and so on), as it happens in auction mechanisms. In fact, rules may vary
according to the type of provided service (i.e., its functionality), and above all according
to the trends of the market that may vary quickly, and not in the same way for all the
QoS attributes. With auction mechanisms, each bidder may have its own strategy, but
once the type of auction is decided, then all bidders know the rules and they have to stick
to them until the auction ends. Moreover, a simple auction mechanism cannot be used in
our setting because of the interdependence among the QoS attributes of the component
services. In fact, it would not be possible to award an auction winner without evaluating
the offers for a given AS with respect to the ones received for the other ASs in the AW.
We argue that these solutions do not model what happens in real markets of services
where predefined bidding mechanisms cannot be assumed and fixed for all the service
types and for all the considered QoS attributes. Therefore, traditional methods with the
protocols and strategies hard-coded in the agents would not work in real market of services
that are open systems. This is why a hybrid negotiation approach was used, where an
auction-like protocol models the bidding of single component services, but without relying
on a specific auction mechanism to allow SPs to adopt their own private strategies when
bidding, and also to change them if required by the market trends.
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3.2.1 The Negotiation Protocol
In this work we adopt the iterated negotiation mechanism proposed in [16], starting from
the assumption that SLAs for QoS-aware SBAs have to be set by coordinating the single
agreements of each component service. In the proposed approach a Service Compositor,
acting on behalf of a service consumer, issues an SBA. It is assumed that for each AS,
specified in the request, a set of Concrete Services (CSs) are available on the market,
each one provided by a specific Service Provider with QoS attributes whose values are
dynamically set by the corresponding SP. In [16], we presented a one–to–many protocol
for the dynamic selection of services, based on the Contract Net Protocol (CNP) [63] that
is one of the most used protocols for negotiating SLAs [54]. CNP works like a business
market where manager agent asks for bids from the contractor agents and then awards
tasks to suitable contractor agent. There are numerous issues related to CNP, which have
been modified and added later on to it. Here, we refer to a slightly modified version of the
Iterative version of the CNP as formalized by FIPA [24]. As described in Figure 3.2, the
negotiation occurs between the SC, that is the initiator of the negotiation, and the SPs
available for each AS of the AW, and it may be iterated for a variable number of times
until a deadline is reached or the negotiation is successful. Each iteration is referred to
as a negotiation round, and the deadline is the number of allowed rounds.
In this protocol the SC may set the deadline according to estimate of parameters
influencing the negotiation progress, so the negotiation may take place for a variable
number of iterations based on the specific situation occurring when a request is issued.
The SC prepares m different call for proposals (cfps), one for each AS in the AW and,
assuming that there are n SPs for each of the m AS, it sends m∗n cfps at each negotiation
round. After waiting for the time set to receive offers, if there are not offers for each AS
in the AW, the SC rejects the received proposals (reject proposal) since it is not possible
to find a CS corresponding to each AS. Otherwise, it evaluates the received offers, and, if
the QoS value obtained by aggregating them does not meet the preference value specified
in the user’s request, it starts another negotiation round sending m ∗ n reject proposals,
and, at the same time, new m ∗ n cfps. If the QoS values of the received offers, once
aggregated, meet the user’s preference, it accepts the offers sent by the corresponding SPs
(sending m accept proposals and m ∗ (n−m) reject proposals). If the deadline is reached
without a success, the negotiation ends with a failure.
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Figure 3.2: The negotiation protocol.
3.3 Gaussian Distributions for Agent Bidding Strate-
gies
In this work, we simulate a market of services where utility functions as well as concession
strategies of service provider agents are modeled through probability distributions [60][16].
The use of such distributions allows simulating the stochastic behavior of service providers
with zero-intelligence [28] that can be used to approximate the trends of a volatile and
open market of services. Moreover, stochastic behavior can be often observed in practical
multi-agent negotiation applications [8], and probability distributions can be implemented
in bounded rational agents.
When dealing with multi–agent multi–issue negotiation, the definition of utility func-
tions is not a simple task. In economic literature, utility functions can modeled as prob-
ability distributions, useful for their mathematical properties [62]. In fact, in multi–issue
negotiation most approaches usually use linear utility functions on the issues [36], while in
single issue negotiation there are rarely linear, but exponential or polynomial functions,
classified as boulware or conceder tactics [32]. According to [32], time dependent and
resource dependent strategies are two important classes of negotiation tactics in service-
oriented domains, already used for modeling B2B interactions [6]. In our approach, we
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use SPs bidding strategies based on Gaussian function that model negotiation on both
single issue [16], and multiple issues [60] where the issues represent the QoS attributes
under negotiation. Such functions can be used to model issues whose offered value can
decrease during the negotiation process until a reservation value is reached.
From a computational perspective, probability distributions may have relevant prop-
erties in the negotiation process since they allow to be used in different negotiation types
with a uniform strategy approach, while simultaneously modeling both the concession
strategy and the utility function. Moreover, Gaussian distributions are used in regression
processes to estimate the concession of an opponent [70].
We show in [60] that the use of such distributions to model agent single and multi issue
concession strategies, proving that their mathematical properties are useful to simulate
the behavior of different agents (with different strategies) involved in the negotiation, and
the composition mechanism in a simple way.
More specifically, the same utility functions and strategies used to model a negotiation
on n issues for one service can be used for the case of a single issue negotiation for n
services. This means that the complexity of the negotiation for SBAs depends on the
number of issues, on the number of SPs, and on the number of ASs composing the SBA.
3.3.1 Single-issue Negotiation













As described [16], a Gaussian distribution may represents the SP utility function, and
at the same time the probability distribution of the offers the SP may issue. The best
offer in terms of SP own utility is represented by the µ value of the Gaussian function,
i.e. U(µ) = 1. Note that µ also corresponds to the QoS value of the offer with the highest
probability to be selected. The Gaussian standard deviation σ represents the attitude of
the provider to concede during negotiation, and it determines the reservation value of the
corresponding agent (µ− σ). Hence, bigger values of σ correspond to smaller reservation
values. The negotiation set of an issue is [µ − σ;µ]. In Figure 3.3 (left), two Gaussian
functions of two service providers with the same value of µ, but different σ (σ1 and σ2)
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Figure 3.3: Two probability distributions for a single–issue negotiation (left), and an
example of concession rate (right).
are shown, with the corresponding offers generated during a negotiation run. In Figure
3.3 (right), the trend of the offered QoS values by the two service providers is shown on
varying the negotiation rounds.
At each negotiation round, an SP generates, following its probability distribution, a
new utility value corresponding to a new offer. If this value is lower than the one offered in
the previous round and within the negotiation set, then it proposes the new value. If this
value is greater than the one offered in the previous round, or it is outside the negotiation
set, the provider proposes the same value offered in the previous round. This strategy
allows to simulate different and plausible behaviors of providers that prefer not having a
consistent loss in utility, even though by increasing the number of negotiation rounds the
probability for the provider to move towards its reservation value increases since it will
always concede.
3.3.2 Multi-issue Negotiation
According to [60], the previous negotiation strategy for a single issue negotiation with
multiple providers of different services, can be easily extended to a multi–issue negotiation.
In this case, instead of the mono–dimensional Gaussian function, a multi–dimensional one
is adopted to model both provider utility, and its attitude to concede.
The formula used to model a multi–variable Gaussian function is the simplest one,
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Figure 3.4: Probability distribution for multi–issues negotiation (left) and two–issues
indifference curves for different utility values (right).
where we do not consider the co–variance among issues, as follows:












where, for each issue qi, σi models the concession attitude when all the other n− 1 issues
are kept fixed, and µi is the value for the issue that corresponds to the greater value of
utility (U(q1, . . . , qn) = 1). Values of the utility function are still in the domain [0, 1], that
is one dimensional (see Figure 3.4 (left)).
This general representation allows to model an utility function with a non–linear de-
pendence among different issues. Starting from this multi–dimensional Gaussian function,
an utility level corresponds to an indifference curve that includes different combinations
of values, one for each issue, having the same utility value for the provider. Hence, differ-
ently from the single–issue case, here, the agent can do trade–offs between values with the
same utility. Trade–offs in a continuous space may become intractable since the problem
is how to select a point in the space or to decide when to concede in utility. In fact,
from the provider point of view, each point laying on the indifferent curve has the same
utility. Some approaches suggest that the agent can make offers, proposing directly all the
negotiation space (with constant utility) [36]. However, this knowledge disclosure (with
the possibility to apply optimality solution theorems), cannot be appropriate in many real
SBAs scenarios. Efficient heuristics to find Pareto or quasi–Pareto optimal solutions exist,
and such approaches rely on the availability of counteroffers from the other agents [36, 73],
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while in [17] near Pareto optimal solutions are found also for a service composition case.
In Figure 3.4 (right), we show different indifference curves generated for different values
of Ux. Given an utility value, the indifference curve is a projection on the issues iper–
plane that models a rational and strictly convex function (properties widely applied in
economics [36]). For the same value Ux a negotiation space is individuated by a section







where, ai is a value that depends on the current value of the global utility, and the
concession parameter σi. In order for a provider agent to have the rationality requirement
only a single portion of such curve is allowed.
Since the distribution is built upon single concession strategies, in our approach, the
concession on the utility can be evaluated by conceding on a single issue only (its marginal
utility), fixing the values of all the others, and then evaluating the new corresponding
utility. Hence, when conceding in utility the agent fixes n−1 issues and makes a concession
on a single issue selecting a value from the Gaussian distribution. If this new value is
greater than the previous value (our outside the negotiation space), the agent continues
to make an offer with the same utility value. However, differently from the single issue
case, the actual values of the offered issues may be different (while keeping the same
utility). Convexity of the utility function ensures that the agent preference on each issue
is monotone when fixing the others. So, if the value increases (or decreases) the utility
always decreases (or increases).
3.3.3 Negotiation for the Composition
Having adopted a Gaussian function to model both the strategies and the utilities of
different providers, allowed to scale from a single–issue to a multi–issue negotiation by
simply scaling the Gaussian dimensions.
In the case of a single issue negotiation, split among different services composing
an SBA, the end–to–end requirements expressed by the user impose a relationship on
the single issues, even though they are independently provided by different providers.
Such relationship is expressed by an aggregation function (e.g., multiplication, sum) to
obtain the global QoS of the entire composition. From a probability point of view, the
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Figure 3.5: Probability distributions for a single-issue negotiation with one SP for each
of the two ASs (left), and the corresponding aggregated (multiplied) probability (right).
composition of issues independently provided according to their probability distributions
can be simulated with the probability distribution of the aggregated value. For this reason,
the negotiation for service composition can be modeled as a multi–issue negotiation (with
the probability distribution of the aggregated value) for a single service, and hence it is
inherently multi–issue.
For example, let us consider the issue being the QoS reliability value. Such issue is
typically aggregated through a multiplication operator. Moreover, let us assume to have
two ASs in the composition and one SP for each AS. Each SP generates offers according
to its Gaussian utility function (respectively, P1(x) = G(µ1, σ1), and P2(y) = G(µ2, σ2)).
The probability distribution of the aggregated offers (c = x ·y) is represented by P (x ·y) =
P1(x) ·P2(y), because the offers are independently provided, i.e., x and y are independent
variables. This distribution is itself a Gaussian distribution since it is the product of two
Gaussian (P (c) = G(µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2)). In Figure 3.5, the probability distributions of both
the composed issue for the single service (right) and of the two component issues for the
two services (left) are shown.











Hence, Gaussian–based utility functions and strategies used to model a negotiation on
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Figure 3.6: Probability distributions for a single-issue negotiation with one SP for each
of the two ASs (left), and the corresponding aggregated (summed) probability (right).
n issues for one service, which represents the composition of the SBA, are the same as the
ones used to model the negotiation for the composition of n services with a single issue.
In the case there are m providers for n ASs, it is necessary to consider all the possible
offer combinations in order to evaluate the end–to–end constraint satisfaction. For this
reason, when mapping the probability distributions of the single services into the one of
the “virtually composed” service, the number of the composed probability distributions to
be considered should be exactly the same as the number of all possible offer combinations,
i.e., to simulate the same problem there should be mn “virtual providers” for the single
virtually composed service.
When the issues are additive (for example the price), the aggregation function is
a sum. The relationship among independent variables, whose values vary according to
probability distributions, is modeled as a convolution of their probability distributions
with additive issues. This means that the probability distribution of the sum of the two
independently provided issues, is the convolution of the single probability distributions of
the corresponding variables (P (x+ y) = P1(x)⊗ P2(y)).
(P1(x)⊗ P2(y)) = exp
[
−(z − (µ1 + µ2))
2




where, z is the sum variable (x+ y).
Hence, since the convolution of two Gaussian functions is still a Gaussian function,
the resulting function can still be used to evaluate the distance of the end–to–end QoS
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requirements from the aggregated QoS values received at a given negotiation round. Dif-
ferently from multiplicative issues, in this case the resulting Gaussian function is still
mono–dimensional. In Figure 3.6, the probability distribution of both the composed issue
for the single service (right) and the two component issues for the two services (left) are
shown for an additive issue.
3.4 Optimality Results
When considering multi–issue negotiation trade off among issue is possible. In these
cases, as reported in the literature [73], it is mathematically proved that the adoption
of an orthogonal bidding strategy leads to near Pareto optimal agreements for resource
allocation problems. When adopting this strategy in service composition, the negotiation
costs in terms of length of the process increase with number of considered component
services and the number of available service providers.
In order to overcome this problem we proposed an extension of orthogonal bidding
strategies called weighted orthogonal bidding strategies that allows on one hand to still
find an agreement if it exists, and on the other hand to concurrently negotiate with all the
services providers available that is not possible with the orthogonal bidding strategies. In
the next paragraphs we report the details of proposed strategy.
3.4.1 Optimality in Service Composition
Let us consider an AW with n ASs (with n ≥ 2) and m QoS issues (with m ≥ 1) for
each of them, and k SPs (with k ≥ 1) for each of the n ASs. For each issue j the SC
agent has a constraint Cj on the whole AW. The SPs formulate new offers, and the SC
evaluates the aggregated value of each considered issue. In this way it is possible to
simulate what happens in a real market of services where a user requesting an SBA does
not have information on the SPs strategies. This means that the SC is not able to make
single counter–proposals with respect to each received offer, because the change of a value
of a particular QoS can impact the constraints to be fulfilled by the QoS of the other
services. SC accepts an offer xti = (x
t
i,1, . . . , x
t
i,m) ∈ <m of the i-th SP if the aggregated
value of the offer with the values of the offers for the remaining ASs, satisfies the global
constraints, so leading to an agreement.
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Definition 1. A set of exactly n offers (xt1, . . . ,x
t
n) is an agreement (A) at round t ⇐⇒∑n
i=1 x
t
i,j ≤ Cj, ∀j ∈ m.
If an agreement is reached with the offers sent at round t, the negotiation ends suc-
cessfully at that round, otherwise all the offers are rejected and, if t+ 1 ≤ tMAX , the SC
engages all SPs in another negotiation round until the deadline tMAX is reached.
Both SC and SPs must be provided with strategies to formulate offers and counterof-
fers, and with algorithms to evaluate them [21]. Generally, offers are evaluated in terms of
agent utility. In a multi–issue negotiation round an agent can either generate a new offer
conceding in its utility (i.e., using a concession strategy), or it can select a new offer with
the same utility (i.e., using a trading–off strategy in case of dependent issues). In this
latter case, these offers belong to the same agent utility curve known as an indifference
curve.
The i-th SP utility is evaluated in terms of its own offer xi. In this work we consider
evaluation functions that are non–linear. Moreover, the considered evaluation functions
are continuous, strictly convex and strictly monotonically increasing in each of the issues.
In general, the utility of an offer xi at round t is evaluated as follows:
ui(xi, t) =
{
0 if t = TMAX and not (A)
vi(xi) if t ≤ TMAX and (A)
(3.2)
where, vi(xi) is the evaluation function, A is an agreement and TMAX is the deadline.
Here, we explicitly model a collaborative approach among different providers of dif-
ferent services to obtain a win-win opportunity. To enhance the possibility to reach an
agreement, each agent may choose the issue values corresponding to a benefit for the
other agents on its indifference curve. Indeed, while keeping the same value of utility, the
agent choose to collaborate in order to find an alternative that is better for the others,
by trading–off among values. Competition remains among providers of the same service,
and it occurs at the concession step.
In a multi-issue negotiation round an agent can either generate a new offer conceding
in its utility (i.e., using a concession strategy), or it can select a new offer with the same
utility (i.e., using a trading-off strategy in case of dependent issue). In this latter case,
these offers belong to the same agent utility curve known as an indifference curve.
We focused on the collaborative part of the negotiation, i.e., when agents make trade–
off, without considering any concession strategy. In particular, we started from the
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trading–off strategy proposed in [73] for multi–agent multi–issue negotiation, called the
orthogonal bidding strategy that was adopted when multiple agents negotiate to distribute
units of resources among them. The strategy relies on the possibility of each agent in-
volved in the negotiation to evaluate a so called reference point introduced in [69], taking
into account the bids of all the other agents involved in the negotiation. Of course, in
multi–agent negotiation a reference point cannot be directly computed by applying a
one–to–one agent interaction, as in [36]. The same happens in service composition since
a single agent offer cannot be used to determine another agent offer because issues are
partitioned among more than two agents.
A reference point of an agent, calculated according to the offers of the other agents,
as in [73], allows the agent to select, step by step, a new offer on its indifference curve
as the point that minimizes the Euclidean distance between the curve and the reference
point. Practically, the reference point of an agent represents the desired bid in order to
reach an agreement, keeping fixed all the other agents bids. Note that in their approach
at each step only one agent can send an offer, while the other offers should be kept fixed,
so reference points have to be computed one at a time.
In our reference market–based scenario, it is likely that for each AS in the AW more
than one SP may issue offers. For this reason, we adopt the heuristic method proposed in
[3] to select at each round a set of agents (one for each AS) providing a set of promising
offers at that round, by assuming that the issues that are negotiated upon are additive
(so the workflow structure is not relevant for their composition). The method consists in
evaluating the utility of each offer, and in selecting the most promising set of offers, one
for each AS, with respect to the global constraints, by considering global constraints as
upper bounds for each issue of the composition. So, a promising combination of offers
B = (bt1, . . . ,btn), one for each AS, is obtained.













where, max(xti,j) is the maximum x
t
i,j issue value offered by the agent i for the issue j
of all the available offers for the ASk at time t (i.e., ∀xti,j ∈ ASk), while min(xti,j) is the
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corresponding minimum xti,j issue value. Equation 3.3 estimates how good an offer is, by
evaluating the QoS values with respect to both the ones offered by the other SPs of the
same service, by taking as a reference the maximum offered value for that issue, and the
QoS values of a possible combination of offers. In fact, the numerator gives an indication
of how good the value of each QoS parameter is with respect to the QoS value offered
by other SPs of the same AS (local evaluation), and it is then related to the possible
aggregated values of the same issue for all the ASs (global evaluation).
Differently from the work of [73], the offers and the SC constraints are private infor-
mation, so it is not feasible for each SP to compute its own reference point. For these
reasons, in our approach, reference points for each AS are calculated by the SC, as a
sort of counteroffer, at the coordination step relying on the offers selected for the most
promising combination at a given round. In addition, reference points are sent to all
SPs providing the same AS, so involving them again in the negotiation even though not
selected. So, the SC plays the role of a sort of mediator since it is the only one that has
the necessary information to compute reference points.
A reference point is defined as follows:
Definition 3. The reference point for the SPs corresponding to an ASi and to m issues
at round t is:
rti = (C1 −
∑
k∈N−i




where btk is the last bid of agent k ∈ N − i selected for the considered combination at
that round.
In [73], the authors proved that a set of offers (xt1, . . . ,x
t
n) is an agreement at round
t iff each reference point ri for each agent i Pareto dominates the bid of the agent it is
calculated for, i.e rti,j ≥ xti,j.
In our approach a reference point, calculated according to the Definition 3, is assumed
to be the reference point for the entire set of available SPs for each AS at a given round.
In this way, all SPs available for each AS are able to negotiate at the successive round by
formulating offers based on the value of the reference point, so to avoid discharging offers
that may become more promising at successive rounds.
We show through simulation example that agents using the orthogonal bidding strat-
egy with the reference points of Definition 3 can reach an agreement, if it exists. Never-
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Figure 3.7: Negotiation evolution for an AW with 3 ASs, and 6 SPs.
theless, no formal proof of the convergence of the reference points towards the agreement
is provided in this work.
In Figure 3.7 is shown the evolution of a negotiation execution for the considered
experimental setting is shown. In particular, we plotted, for each AS, all SPs issue offers
(crosses in the figure) that approach the reference point (empty circles in the figure) for
that AS. The best offers selected at each round (filled circles in the figure), one for each
AS, are used to compute the reference points for the successive round. The negotiation
ends successfully with the set of offers respectively sent by SP1, SP3, and SP6 converging
to the Pareto optimal agreement.
In Figure 3.8, a different negotiation execution is reported for two provider agents of
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Figure 3.8: Offers evolution of the SPs for AS3.
AS3, indicating the reference points computed at each round, the corresponding offers
respectively sent by the two agents, and the selected offers at each round. As shown,
from round 1 to round 4, the offers sent by SP2 are selected as the most promising ones,
while from round 5 to round 10, the offers selected as the most promising ones are those
sent by SP1. The negotiation ends with an agreement including the offer sent by SP1 at
round 10. The possibility to negotiate at each round with all available providers for a
given AS, allowed to achieve a Pareto optimal agreement with an agent that would have
been discarded since it was not promising at the beginning of the negotiation. Hence,
a reference point computed considering a set of single selected offers at a given round,
allows to select a different set of offers at a successive round.
It could happen that an offer for an AS included in a Pareto optimal agreement may
be provided by two different SPs, if the indifference curves intersect: in such a case just
one of the SPs is randomly selected since the selected agent is not relevant for the Pareto
optimality of the agreement.
3.4.2 Optimality in Concurrent Negotiations
Following the approach proposed in [73], the same results concerning Pareto optimal
agreements are obtained, when calculating one reference point for each AS at a time
within the same round. When the number of ASs increases, it is undesirable that an
SP for a given AS waits for the offers of the others SPs of the remaining ASs to get its
reference point since reference points are computed one at a time. This is even more
crucial in an open market of services since the time spent in negotiation may prevent its
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use in this scenario. To avoid this, reference points referred to a given round t should be
computed relying only on the offers available at the previous round as follows:
Definition 4. The timed reference point for the SPi corresponding to an ASi at round
t+ 1 is:
r¯t+1i = (C1 −
∑
k∈N−i




where, for simplicity there is one SP agent for each AS.
Unfortunately, with this definition of reference point, the convergence of the orthogonal
bidding strategy is not guaranteed, but it can diverge and lead to an oscillatory behavior.
This is due to the fact that reference points are concurrently computed at round t, and
used by the SPs to formulate bids at round t+1. This prevents the adjustment of bids for
each AS, step by step, within the same round that is a prerequisite for the convergence
to the agreement. In fact, by concurrently computing the reference points for all AS at
a given round, all the SPs adjust their offers at the successive round assuming that the
other offers are kept fixed, without considering that the other offers are adjusting at the
same time. This may cause that SPs tend to adjust their offers more than necessary. On
the other hand, considering the offers at the previous round when computing reference
points, is the only way to concurrently negotiate with the SPs for all ASs, so avoiding
that the deadlines for each round depend on the number of ASs.
To keep the convergence of the orthogonal bidding strategy, while keeping the possibil-
ity to concurrently compute reference points, it is necessary to provide SPs with reference
points that allow for different adjustments of bids, in terms of different “weights” that
depend on the issue values of the offers with respect to their aggregated values. For this
reason, we introduce a new reference point, named the weighted reference point (rˆti) as
follows:
Definition 5. The weighted reference point for the SPi corresponding to an ASi at
round t+ 1 is rˆt+1i = (rˆ
t+1
i,1 , . . . , rˆ
t+1
i,m ), with rˆ
t+1






· r¯t+1i,j = ωti,j · r¯t+1i,j (3.6)
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where ωti,j is the weight of the issue value at time t compared to the aggregated value of
all the bids for that issue, and r¯t+1i,j is the timed reference point of Definition 4.
Figure 3.9: Execution of 2 rounds of negotiation with rˆti and r¯
t
i.
In Figure 3.9, the behavior of a negotiation in the first two rounds is reported showing
reference points and offers in the case of weighted and timed reference points with the
same initial configuration. As shown, for SP1 the rˆ
t
1 value corresponds to a scaled version
towards the origin of r¯t1, since the relative weights of the two issues are comparable in
the overall agreement. Instead, for SP2 and SP3 the weighted reference points lead to
different new bids (number 2) with respect to the case of timed reference points.
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Figure 3.10: r¯ti (top) and rˆ
t
i (bottom) convergence.
In Figure 3.10, a complete negotiation execution is shown when reference points are
computed respectively according to the Definition 4 (see Figure 3.10 top) and Definition
5 (see Figure 3.10 bottom), starting from the same configuration of SPs and ASs. In the
first case, the negotiation does not converge to an agreement in 100 rounds, while in the
second case such agreement is reached very quickly. These experiments suggest that when
considering weighted reference points they converge to an agreement and, if it exists, it
can be found through a weighted orthogonal bidding strategy. Hence, reference points can
be concurrently computed.
With the weighted reference point of Definition 5, it is not possible to prove the con-
vergence of each reference point to the corresponding bid in the agreement. Nevertheless,
it is possible to prove the following Lemma.
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Lemma 1. A set of offers xt = (xt1, . . . ,x
t
n) is an agreement at round t ⇐⇒ the weighted
reference point for the SPi corresponding to an ASi, rˆ
t+1
i Pareto dominates its weighted
bid at the previous round, i.e. rˆt+1i,j ≥ ωti,jxti,j with j ∈M .









Substituting Definition 4 in Definition 5, it follows that:
rˆt+1i,j = ω
t






















From the agreement condition, the first term in the parenthesis is greater than one,
hence the following inequality is obtained if this term is substituted with 1.
rˆt+1i,j = x
t














If rˆt+1i,j ≥ ωti,j · xti,j then ωti,j · r¯t+1i,j ≥ ωti,j · xti,j by definition of weighted reference point.































≥ 1, that is an agreement.
The validity of the Lemma allows to conclude that, when trading–off among possi-
ble offers with the same utility, the weighted orthogonal bidding strategy leads to an
agreement.
3.4.3 Related work on multi-issue negotiation
Several approaches have been proposed in the literature for selecting services characterized
by QoS attributes for SBAs [46]. Typically, these works rely on static approaches assuming
that QoS parameters of each service do not change during the selection process (they
are predetermined), and they focus on optimality and performances of the provisioning
selection method. Such approaches do not take into account the possibility to dynamically
change the provided QoS values during the selection process that represents the basic
motivation for the use of negotiation in this work.
There are approaches that propose negotiation mechanisms to select services according
the QoS values [54, 62]. In most of these approaches negotiation occurs among a specific
provider selected according to some criteria, that negotiates the values of the QoS param-
eters it provides with a service requester. Hence, the negotiation process is one–to–one
between the service requester and the selected service provider [80, 20]. Other approaches
use negotiation as a mechanism to dynamically select the appropriate service provider
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whose provided service best matches the requester agent QoS requirements [27], as in our
case. But usually negotiation is carried out for each required service independently from
the others. Attempts to propose a coordinated negotiation with all the providers of the
different required services in a composition have been proposed, as in [75], but they in-
troduce a Negotiation Coordinator that instructs the negotiation of the single component
services by decomposing end–to–end QoS into local QoS requirements. On the contrary,
in the present work, a coordinated negotiation mechanism is proposed, where negotiations
occur concurrently with all providers of the different required services in the composition.
Coordination occurs at the end of each negotiation step when the aggregated QoS values,
offered by different SPs, are collectively evaluated to decide whether to accept or not a set
of offers, so to take into account the dependencies among different negotiation processes.
Moreover, the service composition domain requires that the negotiation have to pro-
ceed as a package–deal multi–issue negotiation. While single–issue negotiation is widely
studied in literature, multi–issue negotiation is less mature [36]. Typically, multi issue–
negotiation approaches con be classified as mediated or not mediated ones. Most of the
not mediated approaches rely on bilateral interactions [21, 5]. In this framework a va-
riety of searching methods are proposed in literature, as for example, similarity criteria
based search [20], or decentralized search [36]. In this thesis, we deal with the problem
of multi–issue negotiations where the component issue values are provided by multiple
agents, and thus a requester agent is negotiating with multiple trading partners. In
multi–issue, multi–agent negotiation literature, it is often assumed that there is an unbi-
ased mediator who collects the agents preferences and propose offers to the trading agents
[36, 57, 31, 18]. In this work, the SC agent plays a sort of mediator role. In [36], the
authors propose a Pareto optimal mediating protocol where, at each step, the mediator
provides a negotiation baseline and the agents propose base offers on this line. In [57],
the authors use one–to–many multiple negotiations with a coordinator able to change the
strategies of a specific negotiation thread. In [31], the authors proposed a protocol for
multi–issue negotiation with non linear utility functions and complex preference spaces.
They propose a simulated annealing–based approach as a way to regulate agent decision
making, along with the use of a mediator.
In this work, we do not use concession strategies, but we only focus on the trading–off.
Trading–off to find optimal solution in bilateral multi–issue negotiation was addressed in
[36, 81, 20]. In particular, in [36, 81] an alternating projection strategy was proposed,
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with reference points evaluated with respect to the last offer of the other agent. In [82]
such strategy was extended to the multi–agent case, by evaluating reference points as a
mean sum of all the offers at each step. Differently from our case, in [82] an agreement
corresponds to a single point in the negotiation space, and weights are the same for all
the agents. In [20], the authors used the notion of fuzzy similarity to approximate the
preference weights of the negotiation opponent in order to select the most similar offer
to the last received offer in a pool of generated offers by random trade–offs. In [18],
the authors present a constraint proposal method to generate Pareto–frontier of a multi–
issue negotiation corresponding to a given reference point. In practice, the mediator
adjusts a hyperplane going through a predetermined reference point until the agents
most preferred alternatives on the hyperplane coincide. By choosing reference points on
the line connecting the agent global optima, Pareto optimal points are produced, and
the mediator’s problem has a solution when the number of issues is either two or any
odd number greater than two [35]. In [73], the authors present an automated multi–
agent multi–issue negotiation for allocation of unit resources, similar to our case. The
proposed bidding strategy requires that at each round the agents make bids in a sequential
order. This requirement is not feasible in a service composition scenario because it will
drastically increase the overall negotiation time. Moreover, in [36] for the case of a two
agent negotiation, and in [73], it was shown through simulations that agents always reach
an agreement by using their respective bidding strategy, even though no formal proof of
convergence is given. In [81] for the two agent case, such convergence is proven.
Generally, a buyer gets more desirable negotiation outcomes when it negotiates con-
currently with all the sellers in competitive situations in which there are information
uncertainty and deadlines [47, 48]. A model of concurrent negotiation was addressed in
[5], where agents are allowed to make counter–proposal without having received proposals
from all its trading partners. In [47, 48], the multiple negotiation threads still happen
in the same negotiation round, as in our case, but the heuristic methods used by the
negotiation coordinator strongly depend on history information about trading partners
and negotiation environment. In our dynamic market based scenario, past information is
not always relevant to drive negotiation.
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3.5 Experimentation on negotiation for service com-
position
We report several experiments in order to evaluate the impact of the number of SPs and
ASs on the negotiation progress. In particular, in subsection 3.5.1, we carried out a set
of experiments to extract useful information on the trends of the adopted negotiation
mechanism in a set of predefined configurations characterized by negotiation parameters
affecting the negotiation protocol that are the number of allowed negotiation rounds, the
number of ASs composing the required application, and the number of SPs involved in
the interaction. Moreover, we carried out a set of experiments reported in subsection
3.5.2 to numerically evaluate negotiation trends in the case of multiplicative and additive
QoS issue in service composition, comparing negotiation trends in the case in which the
composition problem is the provision of a single composed service.
3.5.1 One-issue Negotiation
In this subsection, we report the experiments were carried out to numerically validate
some hypothesis concerning specific aspects of the negotiation, with the main objective
to individuate negotiation parameters values for which it is possible to foresee the trend
of negotiation in advance. The efficiency of the negotiation mechanism is evaluated with
respect to two performance measures: negotiation outcome (i.e., the utility of the solution
and/or the negotiation success rate), and communication costs. For the time being, the
negotiation communication cost is evaluated with a simple measure of the number of bits
communicated [49] or, equivalently, the number of ex-changed messages, assuming a fixed
cost per transmitted messages. In this research, evaluation of communication costs does
not consider the time actually spent in negotiation including both the time necessary to
process the exchanged messages, and the time necessary for the messages to travel from
the sender to the receiver to actually exchange the messages. This is because we are
interested in determining the negotiation parameters affecting the communication cost,
and not to define metrics to measure it. In multi-agent systems literature, communication
cost is evaluated also in terms of the achieved coordination [11], and to decide when to
communicate [56], or when to change the coordination mechanism/protocol. Here, the
communication cost of the negotiation process is also evaluated as the communication
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overhead with respect to the success of the negotiation process resulting in the composition
of the required SBA. In principle, the collected information may be used by the SC to
avoid, when possible, useless expensive negotiations.
3.5.1.1 Compositor and Providers Utility Functions and Strategies
Here, we introduce the decision making algorithm for the SC evaluation of proposals and
for the strategies to generate an offer by the SPs, proposed in [16]. The SC receives
service offers at each negotiation round. It checked that there is at least one offer for each
AS and it evaluates if the global constraints specified by the user are met. In literature
different mechanism to evaluate the constraints satisfaction are proposed. Here, the SC
evaluates, at each negotiation round, the received offers (both for the same AS, and for
the different ASs) by solving a Linear Programming problem formulated as in [3]. In the
case of a single additive QoS parameter (e.g. “price”), the SC evaluates the utility of the







Equation 3.7 provides a way to evaluate the utility for the SC of one offer with respect
to both the ones offered by the other service providers for the same service, and to
the entire workflow. It gives an indication of how good the value of each offered QoS
parameter is with respect to other values of QoS offered by other SPs of the same abstract
service i (local evaluation) by taking as a reference the maximum offered value for that
parameter. Denominator of Equation 3.7 gives an indication of how good the value of
each parameter is with respect to the possible aggregate values of the same parameter
for all the abstract services (global evaluation). It should be remarked that the SC does
not formulate counteroffers for each AS since a counteroffer for one SP will depend on
the offers received from the SPs of the remaining ASs. Furthermore, the SC’s utility is
related to the distance between the QoS preferences, expressed at the time of the request is
issued, and the aggregated QoS values obtained by combining the best offers (for each AS)
evaluated according to Equation 3.7. It is normalized so that it is 1 in case of negotiation
success and 0 for failures. In the case of price SC’s utility is expressed as follows.
USC = 1−
∑m
i=1 pricei,s − reqPrice
reqPrice
(3.8)
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where, pricei,s is the price offered for the ith AS by the selected s PS, and so
∑m
i=1 pricei,s
is the aggregated value for the price. reqPrice is the user requested price for the AW.
On the contrary, SPs apply their own strategies to formulate their offers. These strate-
gies are modeled as a set of functions that are both time and resource dependent [32],
and they take into account both the computational load of the provider, and the compu-
tational cost of the provided service. The computational load of the provider accounts
for the number of requests it agreed to fulfill, i.e., the amount of service implementations
it will deliver, while the computational cost of the service represents a measure of the
complexity of the provided service, i.e., the more complex the service is the higher its
expected cost is. SPs strategies to concede in utility are modelled, as in [16], as Gaussian
distributions. This assumption models the scenario where services providing the same
functionality have the same “market price” corresponding to the maximum utility for
the SP providing that service. At each negotiation round, the SP generates, following
its provision strategy, a new value of utility corresponding to a new offer to be sent to
the SC by comparing the new offer with the previously generated one to decide whether
to submit it or not. This is a variation of the standard negotiation mechanisms where
the utility of a new generated offer is compared with the last one generated by the other
negotiation partner.
3.5.1.2 Parameter Tuning
Before carrying out the experiments, it is necessary to evaluate the impact of the values
of the ki parameter on the negotiation process for different configurations, so to find
ki values for which negotiation is required to find feasible solutions, i.e. composition
of services whose QoS values are within the preferences specified in the user’s request.
Initially, negotiation is required when all the values of ki are greater than one. In order to
consider services with a different degree of complexity, we randomly distribute ki values
in the interval [2/3, 5/2] for the services composing the SBA. The lower limit of 2/3 is to
simulate ASs with simple features (i.e., with a low bestPricei), while the upper limit of
5/2 is to simulate the ones with more complex features. For each SP, the associated σi
value is randomly selected in the interval [bestPricei ∗ 0.25, bestPricei ∗ 0.5]. The lower
bound (resV aluei = bestPricei − bestPricei ∗ 0.5) is for SPs willing to concede till half
of their bestPricei, while the upper bound (resV aluei = bestPricei − bestPricei ∗ 0.25)
is for SPs less willing to concede. The considered setups for the experiments vary the
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Figure 3.11: Percentage of failures and successes varying the k value (left). Number of
rounds for successes varying the k value (right).
number of ASs (i.e., 2, 5, 10), and the number of SPs for each AS (from 2 to 32). For
each configuration 50 executions were carried out. The average success rate on the total
number of executions, for all the considered configurations, is 80%. This indicates that
the interval [2/3, 5/2] of ki is reasonable with respect to the user’s request. Then, the
impact of the mean value of the ki parameter for each single run is evaluated to determine
a reasonable value to be set for all the other experiments. In order to do so, the obtained
results are split into two classes: executions that led to successes and executions that
led to failures. Within each class, the mean value of ki is calculated over 50 executions
for each considered configuration. The obtained results show that for average values of
ki greater than 1.9, the failure rate is 100%, while for average values of ki less than 1.5,
the success rate is 100% (see Figure 3.11-left). More specifically, for mean values of ki
less than 1.25, there is no need to negotiate since the values of offers sent at the first
negotiation round already satisfy the user request (see Figure 3.11-right). While, mean
values of ki in the interval [1.25, 1.9] corresponds to users’ requests comparable to the
market prices of the services composing the AW, but that still need more than one round
of negotiation to reach an agreement. Hence, for the following experiments we consider
mean ki values in such interval.
3.5.1.3 Experimental Settings
The configurations considered for the following experiments set different deadlines at 1,
10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 negotiation rounds, and for each deadline the number of SPs at
2, 4, 8, 16, 32, with a fixed configuration for the AW with 5 ASs. Let us highlight that
for a deadline of 1 round, the protocol is based on m concurrent Contract Net Protocols
(CNP). We also considered a configuration where the negotiation occurs only with one SP
for each AS, that is the best SP in terms of USC(OX), where Ox are the offers received at
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bestPricei($)
# ASs 1 2 3 4 5
5 648 540 351 270 216
Table 3.1: Distribution of services costs for 5 ASs.
round 1. In this case, the deadline varies from 10 to 50 rounds. The user requested price
is 1350$ (reqPrice). For each AS a default price bestPricei is set, and the corresponding
SPs will send as initial offer a price randomly extracted in the neighborhood of bestPricei
[bestPricei − 5% ∗ bestPricei, bestPricei]. This is because, even though the market price
of services corresponding to the same AS is the same, to model a real market of services
the variability of the first offered price is introduced. bestPricei values for the considered
ASs are shown in Figure 3.1.
The σ value randomly varies for each SP in the range [0, bestPricei/2], so with respect
to the previous parameter tuning experiments, we also include SPs with the maximum
computational load that are not willing to concede (i.e. σ = 0). This will increase the
number of possible failures in the negotiation process. In all the experiments 100 runs
were performed for each of the described configurations.
3.5.1.4 Numerical Evaluation of Hypothesis
In this paragraph we report the numerical results obtained for the different configurations
to validate a number of hypothesis concerning the trends of the negotiation that could
support the decision-making mechanism of the SC.
Hypothesis-1 It is not worth negotiating with one SP for each AS.
The first set of experiments was conducted in order to evaluate the percentage of negotia-
tion successes when negotiation takes place with only 1 SP for each AS. The configurations
considered for the experiments vary the number of rounds (at 10, 20, 30, 40) with a fixed
number of ASs (at 5), and with a fixed number of SPs (at 8) for each AS. At the first
negotiation round the “best” SP is selected by evaluated the best-received offer, for each
AS. In Figure 3.2 the percentage of negotiation successes is reported, and the results show
that selecting the best SP at round 1 results in a low success rate. In fact, only the 12%
of success rate is obtained with 30 or 40 negotiation rounds allowed, so in this case it is
not worth negotiating at all.
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1 SP for each AS
# Rounds 10 20 30 40
% Successes 1 6 12 12
Table 3.2: Success rate varying the number of rounds with only the “best” SP for each
AS.
Figure 3.12: Success rate varying the number of rounds and the number of SPs for each
AS.
Hypothesis-2 The percentage of successes increases by increasing the number of negoti-
ation rounds and the number of SPs for each AS.
We evaluated the percentage of negotiation successes varying the number of rounds (at
10, 20, 30, 40), and the number of SPs (at 2, 4, 8, 16, 32) for each AS (fixing the number
of ASs at 5). In Figure 3.12 we plotted the percentage of negotiation successes in the case
negotiation occurs with all the available SPs for a fixed number of negotiation rounds. As
expected, for a deadline of 1 round (simple CNP protocol) we have 100% of failures since
the specific settings of the tests require a negotiation phase to find a feasible solution.
By increasing the number of rounds, a better success rate than the one shown in Table
3.2 is obtained by just adding another provider for each AS. In fact with 2 SPs for each
ASs, 50% of successes are obtained with 30 or 40 allowed negotiation rounds, as shown in
Figure 3.13. Scaling up the number of SPs from 4 to 32 the success rate increases from
90% to 100% just after 10 rounds. These results support the choice to negotiate with all
the available SPs, since the increase in the communication cost coming from negotiating
with more SPs is partially compensated by an in-crease in the negotiation success rate.
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Hypothesis-3 Negotiation with all the SPs for a fixed number of rounds introduces a
considerable overhead in communication.
In order to evaluate the computational cost of the protocol due to communication oc-
curring between the SC and the available SPs, we calculated the maximum number of
exchanged messages for different configurations. The original formulation of CNP requires
O(n) messages, where n denotes the number of participants. In the considered version of
the protocol, as described in [16], at each negotiation round the SC sends m ∗ n call for
proposals, receives at the most m ∗ n possible offers, and it sends back at most m accept
and/or m ∗n reject messages. This means that for each round the cost of communication
in terms of exchanged messages is at most 3 ∗ n ∗ m (i.e., O(n ∗ m)). The maximum
numbers of exchanged messages are reported in Table 3.3 for the same configurations as
the previous experiments.
1 SP for each AS
# Rounds 1 2 4 8 16 32
1 15 30 60 120 240 480
10 150 300 600 1200 2400 4800
20 300 600 1200 2400 4800 9600
30 450 900 1800 3600 7200 14400
40 600 1200 2400 4800 9600 19200
Table 3.3: Maximum number of messages varying the number of SPs and the deadline.
A comparative evaluation of Table 3.3 and in Figure 3.12 shows that, provides infor-
mation on the trade-off between communication costs and success rate. In particular,
from configurations with 2400 exchanged messages to configurations with 9600 no vari-
ation in success rate is obtained (that is stable at 100%). This means that from 2400
onward there is only a communication over-head without any gain in the success rate.
A first conclusion of this evaluation is that negotiating with 16 SPs for each AS with
respect to negotiating with 8 SPs will not change the success rate, but it will only re-
quire, hypothetically, more exchanged messages. Hence, in this case, selecting a sub-set of
available providers reduces the cost of communication without affecting the success rate.
Moreover, as already showed in Figure 3.2, such selection cannot be made only evaluating
current offers because promising providers may change their concession strategy during
the interaction. So, it is possible to randomly select the SPs to negotiate with.
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Figure 3.13: Success rate evaluated with respect to the number of messages.
Figure 3.14: The SC utility for different configurations in case of negotiation failures.
Hypothesis-4 Utility variation for the SC may suggest when to stop negotiating.
As stated in Hypothesis 3, with a fixed number of negotiation rounds, communication
overhead is introduced when the number of negotiation rounds increases (in the case the
negotiation takes place for all the fixed number of rounds). Hence, it would be useful
to extract information on the negotiation trends to decide when to stop negotiating. At
this purpose we evaluated the variation of the SC global utility in case of failures. In
particular, the number of SPs for each AS is 2 and 4, and the deadline is set to 10, 20,
30 and 40 rounds. Note that by increasing the number of SPs to more than 4 SPs, only
successes are obtained from round 10th onward. In Figure 3.14 the SC utility is re-ported
for the cases of deadline set to 10 and 30 varying the number of available SPs and the
deadline of the negotiation. Trends for cases failures at 20 and 40 are similar. Results
show that the SC utility varies very little by increasing the number of the negotiation
rounds, so making proceeding with negotiation expensive without any benefit in the SC
utility.




2 0.0223 0.0082 0.0042
4 0.0221 0.0043 0.0083
Average 0.0222 0.0063 0.0062
STD 0.0002 0.0028 0.0029
Table 3.4: SC utility variation in case of failures.
bestPricei($)
# ASs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 1350 675 - - - - - - - -
5 648 540 351 270 216 - - - - -
10 351 324 297 270 230 175 135 108 81 54
Table 3.5: Distribution of services costs varying the number of ASs.
In the Figure 3.14 the SC utility variation in case of failures is reported in order to
allow the SC to dynamically stop the negotiation according to its trend, i.e., according
to whether and in which measure its utility is varying. The variation is calculated as a
difference between the value of the SC utility respectively at rounds 10 and 20 (for the
first column), at rounds 20 and 30 (for the second column), at rounds 30 and 40 (for the
third column). The variation is evaluated varying the number of SPs (2 and 4). The
average SC utility variation with the corresponding standard deviation are summarized
in Figure 3.14. Results show that in the configurations with the number of SPs equal to
2 and 4, by increasing the number of rounds the SC utility variation is less than 1% after
20 rounds, so indicating that keeping on negotiating is not likely to lead to a success.
3.5.1.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this paragraph we present the results of the experiments carried out to evaluate the
communication costs of the negotiation process. In particular, we report the number of
messages actually exchanged to reach a success, and not the ones theoretically calculated
to reach the negotiation deadline, as in the previous experiments. The considered config-
urations are the same as the previous experiments, but including, for some of them, three
different AWs composed respectively of 2, 5 or 10 ASs. Distributions of market prices
(bestPricei) for the different ASs are shown in the Figure 3.5. Furthermore, 500 runs for
each configuration are carried out.
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Figure 3.15: Success rate and number of rounds varying the number of SPs.
Hypothesis-5 It is worth to increase the number of SPs if for the SC it is sufficient only
to meet the global requirements.
As stated in Hypothesis 2, by increasing the number of SPs and negotiation rounds the
success rate increases, and also the number of combinations that satisfy the global require-
ments. This can be useful when the SC tries to maximize its own utility. Nevertheless, as
stated in Hypothesis 3, it increases also the communication overhead, since the theoretical
maximum number of exchanged messages increases. Here, we evaluate the success rate
with respect to the number of rounds (see Figure 3.15), and with respect to the actual
number of exchanged messages (see Figure 3.16 ), varying the number of SPs (at 2, 4, 8,
16, 32) in the case of 5 ASs, and fixing the number of negotiation rounds at 100, by keeping
on negotiating for all the allowed rounds. The obtained experimental results show that,
in the case of a relevant number of SPs, long negotiation mechanisms are not necessary in
order to reach a success, i.e. if the SC wants to select just one combination of offers that
meet the global requirement, so stopping negotiation as soon as the first feasible combi-
nation of offers is found, without any optimization. In fact, as shown in Figure 3.15 and
in Figure 3.16, with number of SPs is greater than or equal to 8 a feasible combination
is found quickly, so requiring few negotiation rounds, and hence less exchanged messages
(no more than 1000 messages). Of course, in the case the best combination, in terms of
the SC utility, has to be selected, negotiation should proceed for the allowed number of
rounds so more feasible combinations can be found to optimize the SC utility.
Hypothesis-6 Trading off is possible.
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Figure 3.16: Success rate and number of messages (cut at 6000) varying the number of
SPs.
We carried out experiments to evaluate the number of exchanged messages to reach a
success (i.e. a feasible solution if any), and the percentage of successes by varying the
number of ASs (to 2, 5, and 10), and the number of SPs for each AS (to 2, 4, 8, 16, 32)
with a negotiation deadline at 100 rounds. In particular, we report the ratio between
the average number of messages actually ex-changed and the percentage of success rep-
resenting a measure of a “tradeoff” between the negotiation communication cost and the
probability of succeeding in the negotiation. The smaller this value is, the better the con-
figuration is for the negotiation. Figure 3.17 shows that a configuration with 8 SPs for the
different number of ASs considered in the experiments, is an acceptable tradeoff between
the negotiation communication cost and benefits (i.e. the percentage of successes). This
result gives an indication on a reasonable number of SPs to negotiate with, so making
it possible to limit the communication overhead in case the number of available SPs for
each AS is high. Note that a high rate of failures resulting in keeping on negotiating until
the deadline (so increasing considerably the number of exchanged messages) for the cases
with 2 and 4 SPs is responsible for the high values of the standard deviation in the results.
Hypothesis 7 Increasing the number of ASs is not the same as increasing the number
of SPs.
According to Hypothesis 2, by increasing the number of SPs, the percentage of successes
increases. This is because in the stochastic market we modeled in this work, an increase
in the number of negotiators corresponds to an increase in the variability of the market,
74 CHAPTER 3. NEGOTIATION FOR SMART SERVICE COMPOSITION
Figure 3.17: Tradeoff varying number of ASs and number of SPs.
that statistically results in improving the possibility of a negotiation success, and hence
in a higher percentage of negotiation successes. In principle, the number of SPs involved
in the negotiation increases also if the number of ASs increases. So, it could be concluded
that increasing the number of ASs, may result in improving the negotiation success rate.
However, this is not true in the case of service composition since the increase in the number
of ASs consists in a more complex composition. This is confirmed by the results reported
in Table 3.6 where the percentage of successes is evaluated with respect to the number of
ASs, the average number of negotiation rounds necessary to reach a negotiation success
(together with the associated standard deviation), and the average number of exchanged
messages (together with the associated standard deviation). Recall that high values for
standard deviation are due to the number of failures occurring during negotiation. As
shown in Table 3.6, with the same total number of SPs, different percentage of successes
are obtained for different AW configurations. In fact, considering the same number of SPs
involved in the negotiation (e.g. 20), the success percentage is 62% in the case of 10 ASs
and 2 SPs for each AS, and it is 96% in the case of 5 ASs and 4 SPs for each AS.
The experimental results showed that, in cases of negotiation failures, after a certain
number of rounds no gain is obtained in the success rate. Hence, this information could
be used to predict the negotiation outcome in order to decide to stop negotiation without
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# SPs # AS % Success
# Round # Message
Average ST. Dev. Average ST. Dev.
2
2 58% 48 45 580 541
5 61% 48 43 1438 1291
10 62% 49 42 2925 2528
4
2 87% 19 32 452 768
5 96% 10 19 599 1130
10 99% 7 11 871 1276
8
2 99% 5 8 220 387
5 100% 3.2 1.5 380 179
10 100% 3.1 0.8 757 200
16
2 100% 2.4 0.8 231 77
5 100% 2.2 0.5 540 113
10 100% 2.1 0.3 1029 171
32
2 100% 2.0 0.3 397 49
5 100% 2.0 0.1 965 48
10 100% 2.0 0.04 1922 43
Table 3.6: Experiments summary.
any loss in terms of consumer’s utility (limiting the cost of negotiation in terms of its
length). Of course, these results are related to the considered configurations, and also to
the specific strategies adopted for the SPs.
3.5.2 Composition vs. Orchestrated Negotiation
Here, we carried out another set of experiments to numerically evaluate the trends of
negotiation in the case of multiplicative and additive QoS issue in service composition.
We also compare the trends of negotiation when the composition problem is represented
in terms of the provision of a single virtually composed service.
The attributes of the composed service have been composed, according to the aggre-
gation function, that is the composition of utility functions of the components issues, and
are offered following this function.
The aim of this numerical analysis is to show that the mathematical equivalence of the
Gaussian distributions is also reflected in the obtained experimental negotiation trends.
These trends are measured in terms of the:
• percentage of successes obtained during the negotiation (%succ),
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Figure 3.18: Probability distributions for a single–issue (reliability) negotiation with two
SPs (left) and an example of the aggregated probabilities (right).
• number of negotiation rounds necessary to reach that success percentage (#rounds),
• number of the corresponding exchanged messages (#mess).
These negotiation parameters are computed for an SBA request composed of 2 ASs, by
varying the number of SPs (from 1 to 4) and the number of allowed negotiation rounds
(from 10 to 30). The reported values are mediated on a number of 100 experiments for
each considered configuration.
We first considered the case of multiplicative QoS values, such as the reliability value
of the complete application that is given by the multiplication of the reliability values
of its component services. For simplicity, in this case, we considered only 1 SP for each
AS. The SPs probability distributions, for one negotiation run, are plotted in Figure 3.18
(left), together with the offers generated at different negotiation rounds. The trends of
the negotiation are compared with the same problem represented by considering a single
provider whose utility function is the product of the utility functions of the two providers
(one for each AS), so representing the distribution of the composed QoS values offered
for the virtually composed service. An example of such distribution is reported in Figure
3.18 (right), together with the composed offers generated at different negotiation rounds.
As discussed in Subsection 3.3.3 , in multi–issue negotiation trade–off among issues is
possible. In fact, as shown in Figure 3.18 (right), in the considered negotiation run, an
agreement is reached at round 7, with the last offer lying on the same indifference curve
of the previous three ones.
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reliability
% succ # rounds # mess
1 SP - 2 AS 1 SPc 1 SP - 2 AS 1 SPc 1 SP - 2 AS 1 SPc
10 round 0.83± 0.40 0.88± 0.33 5.1 4.6 10 9
20 round 0.84± 0.37 0.97± 0.17 7.6 5.6 15 11
30 round 0.91± 0.29 0.99± 0.10 8.5 5.2 17 10
Table 3.7: Negotiation trends values for multiplicative issues.
As shown in Table 3.7, the percentages of successes for the two problem configurations
are comparable within the error, with better values in the case of the multi–issue case, as
expected. This behavior may be due to the fact that the adopted concession strategy for
the composed offers (i.e., a marginal concession and a trade–off) is not the same as the one
adopted for the two individual offers. In addition, in the multi–issue case, the number
of offers with the same probability to be offered increases, so leading to an increased
probability of success that becomes more evident by increasing the number of negotiation
rounds. Accordingly, also the number of rounds necessary to reach success is lower in the
multi–issue case. Finally, since in the latter case negotiation occurs only with one SP, the
number of exchanged messages is lower that the single–issue negotiation.
In the second set of experiments, we considered the case of additive QoS values, such
as the price value of the complete application that is given by the sum of the price values
of its component services. Also in this case, we evaluate if the problem of finding n
services that, once combined, provide an overall QoS acceptable value, is the same as
the problem of finding 1 service providing n QoS values composing an overall acceptable
QoS value. Hence, the trends of the single–issue negotiation are compared with the ones
of the same problem represented by considering a single service provided by SPs whose
utility functions are the convolutions of the utility functions of two providers (one for each
AS). In order to have the same negotiation configuration in both cases, as reported in
Subsection 3.3.3, we have to consider all the possible combinations of the two component
QoS values, independently provided for the case of two services. So when SPs vary from 1
to 4 for each AS, the number of SPs in the single service case, varies from 12 to 42, where
each SP has an utility function obtained by the convolution of the two utility functions
of two SPs of the component services. Since the convolution of two mono–dimensional
Gaussian function is still a mono–dimensional Gaussian function, the utility function used
to generate the virtually composed QoS values is mono–dimensional.
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Figure 3.19: Probability distributions for a single–issue (price) negotiation with two SPs
(left) and an example of the 4 aggregated probabilities (right).
The probability distributions of two SPs (one for each AS), and the corresponding con-
voluted distribution together with the offers generated in both cases at different rounds,
for a negotiation run, are reported respectively in Figure 3.19 (left) and (right). As shown
in Table 3.8, the negotiation trends in terms of percentage of successes are comparable
within the error. This is confirmed by the number of negotiation rounds for both ex-
periments that are the same. It should be noted that the end–to–end constraints used
in these experiments is set in such a way that it is difficult to reach an agreement also
by increasing the number of SPs. But with this setting, a high number of negotiation
failures occurs so causing a big fluctuation of the collected results, and hence an increased
value of the standard deviation. Nevertheless, the number of messages exchanged during
negotiation increases exponentially with the number of SPs available for each AS. In fact,
in order for the two problem representations to be equivalent the number of SPs for the
composed QoS increases exponentially with the number of ASs.
We showed that by modelling non linear utility functions, as well as concession strate-
gies through the use of normal distributions, allows to deal with computational tractability
requirements need by real market of services, due to their properties in scaling up in di-
mensions and convolutions. More specifically, with the adopted strategies, negotiation in
SBAs is shown to be inherently multi–issue even in the case of a single–issue negotiation,
where the multiple dimensions are given by the requirement of composing the QoS pro-
vided by the different component services to meet the end–to–end constraint. In fact,
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price
% success # rounds # messages
1 SP - 2 AS 1 SPc 1 SP - 2 AS 1 SPc 1 SP - 2 AS 1 SPc
10 round 0.13± 0.34 0.10± 0.30 9.6 9.6 19 19
20 round 0.21± 0.41 0.11± 0.31 17.6 18.7 35 37
30 round 0.23± 0.42 0.15± 0.36 25.7 27.3 51 55
2 SP - 2 AS 4 SPc 2 SP - 2 AS 4 SPc 2 SP - 2 AS 4 SPc
10 round 0.34± 0.48 0.24± 0.43 8.5 8.9 34 71
20 round 0.38± 0.50 0.31± 0.46 14.7 16.2 59 129
30 round 0.43± 0.50 0.36± 0.44 21.5 25.0 86 200
3 SP - 2 AS 9 SPc 3 SP - 2 AS 9 SPc 3 SP - 2 AS 9 SPc
10 round 0.43± 0.50 0.35± 0.48 8.0 8.4 48 152
20 round 0.65± 0.48 0.54± 0.50 12.0 12.4 72 223
30 round 0.70± 0.46 0.61± 0.50 15.8 18.6 95 335
4 SP - 2 AS 16 SPc 4 SP - 2 AS 16 SPc 4 SP - 2 AS 16 SPc
10 round 0.61± 0.49 0.57± 0.50 7.1 6.7 57 215
20 round 0.74± 0.44 0.60± 0.49 10.6 11.7 85 374
30 round 0.78± 0.42 0.64± 0.48 14.5 15.2 112 488
Table 3.8: Negotiation trends values for additive issues.
Gaussian–based utility functions used to model providers of n different services with a
single QoS negotiating for reaching a successful composed QoS value, can be mapped to
Gaussian–based utility functions that model providers of a single service with an already
composed QoS value. The expected behavior of the negotiation trends in different but
equivalent representations of a service composition problem, is supported by the reported
numerical analysis.
In conclusion, the adoption of Gaussian–based strategies in negotiation for service
composition allows to use the same negotiation mechanism in terms of protocols, strate-
gies and utilities for both single issue and multi–issue negotiation, and they are easy to
implement. Furthermore, the negotiation in service composition can be represented by
different problem configurations that are equivalents due to the properties of the adopted
Gaussian functions. These configurations can be used to carry out service composition




Negotiation for Decision Making
In this chapter, we present the smart parking application developed using a negotiation
mechanism between software agents, allowing to automate the selection of parking spaces
according to the user preferences and taking into account the city needs.
The application has been developed in the context of the research project S2-Move a
PON funded by the MIUR on Smart City and Social Innovation. The goal of this project is
to provide ICT-based solutions for the monitoring and the real-time management of urban
mobility, providing information services for motorists interactive through the integration
of ICT and the exchange of information between individual users. For this reason, it
was developed an intelligent platform that allows data collection, analysis and processing,
providing intelligent and efficient solutions to the citizens. In this scenario, the user
becomes part of the platform because it provides information that is at the base of the
operation of the services made available by platform, in order to return solutions for ”easy
and sustainable” mobility.
The type of information collected is heterogeneous, retrieved from different devices
(e.g. smartphones and tablets) and from hardware systems embedded directly on board
the cars. The use of such systems on private vehicles and public utilities (e.g. public
transport, vehicles of the police or the health service) allows to gather updated information
and the status of urban mobility.
The services developed on platform of project, that are provided on through the web,
mobile apps and embedded devices on-board, are the follows:
• Traffic Monitoring that estimates the traffic in the city, managing the information
provided by cars monitored;
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• Fleet Management that allows the monitoring and management of vehicle fleets;
• Warning Management that allows users to report faults and warnings present
in the urban area, such as the presence of traffic, potholes and disadvantageous
conditions for mobility.
• Smart Parking System provides a service to visualize, choose and book a parking
spot.
In particular, the research carried out for developing Smart Parking Services service
will be described in detail in the following sections.
4.1 Smart Parking Application Scenario
Urban transportation is considered a relevant investigation area for the innovation of
Smart Cities since it may contribute to increase the quality of life of city-dwellers, to
enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of the city economy, and to move towards the
sustainability of cities by improving resource efficiency and meeting emission reduction
targets. The main themes addressed in urban transportation for Smart Cities are:
• Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems and Services (C-ITS), based on the prin-
ciple that all cooperative parties (i.e. ITS stations, vehicles, road side units) ex-
change information between each other, so enabling up-to-date traffic information,
improved road safety and traffic efficiency.
• Enabling Seamless Multi-modality for End Users, based on the possibility to combine
public transport with other motorized and non-motorized modes as well as with new
concepts of vehicle ownership.
• Smart Organization of Traffic Flows and Logistics that involves multi-agency inter-
action, linking individual mobility with public transport services.
In this framework, one of the challenging problems linked to the above themes, is parking
in urban areas. It is widely recognized that drivers searching for a parking space in wide
urban areas waste time and fuel, so increasing traffic congestion and air pollution [55]. It
is not always possible to address the problem by creating more parking spaces, but rather
“intelligent” parking facilities are necessary.
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The use of advanced technologies, including vehicle sensors, wireless communications,
and data analytic, is the base for the efficient allocation, monitoring, and management
of smart parking solutions for future Smart Cities in order to improve urban mobility
strategies. Most of the research projects concerning smart parking systems focus on ways
to collect and publish live parking information to drivers so they can be informed of avail-
able parking spaces near the destination they require. At the same time, many companies
are developing electronic parking systems allowing for a wide variety of available payment
methods in conjunction with the dissemination of parking availability information. Nev-
ertheless, they lack of intelligent features allowing not only to advise motorists of available
car parks in multiple zones, but more importantly to help them in making decisions on
where to park.
Mechanisms to manage the relationship between supply and demand are necessary
to provide user-oriented automatic parking services that take into account both drivers
preferences, and parking vendors requirements together with social benefits for the city,
such as a reduction of traffic in city centres by limiting parking in that area [64].
Usually, parking applications provide users with available parking spaces among which
to select the preferred one according to their own preferences, if possible. In the Smart
Cities of the future, users should be equipped with applications able to carry out this
selection automatically, and more importantly, to take into account different requirements
for a parking space based on user profiles (e.g. business, tourist, generic) that may have
different preferences on parking attributes. Furthermore, in order to help refining the
selection process, additional information may be used (that could come from other sources
of information), such as unavailability of public transportation at the required time, the
necessity to reach different locations once the car has been parked, the possibility to find
other attractions in the area, and so on.
Another problem of parking in big cities is the fragmentation of public and private
parking providers, each one adopting their own technology to collect occupancy data that,
as such, cannot be easily shared among different owners or made accessible by user-friendly
applications. In order to provide motorists with smart parking applications, the first step
would be to encourage public and private parking providers to share their data and to
build smart parking software applications that coordinate individual parking solutions
for end users without involving them in the fragmentation of parking owners. At the
same time, individual parking owners should be made aware of the benefits of providing
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such a global parking provision showing them that the coordinated provision of parking
solutions still guarantees their individual income and fair competition by better exploiting
the parking spaces offered in a city. Furthermore, a coordinated parking system allows to
gather information to dynamically change the price of the offered parking spaces according
to market-based evaluations based on the flow of user requests and the occupancy of the
car parks in a given time interval (e.g., the price could decrease according to the occupancy
of the parking, or to the time requested by the user), their geographical location, and so
on.
In this context, we investigate the possibility to use software agent negotiation to
address some of the challenges concerning smart parking and mobility pricing strategies.
In particular, we propose an automated negotiation mechanism among a software agent
that models a Parking Manager (PM) responsible for providing parking spaces, and a
software agent User Agent (UA) acting on behalf of a motorist searching for a parking
space in the specific city area. Negotiation is used in order to accommodate both users
and providers needs that are different and, more importantly, conflicting. In fact, the
Parking Manager has the objective to sell parking spaces to make a profit, but to prevent,
as much as possible, motorists to park in the specific city area, while users would prefer to
save as much money as possible, but to park close to the city center location they require.
The allocation of the parking space is the result of a negotiation process between the
Parking Manager and the user having their own private utility functions respectively to
make a parking space offer, and to evaluate whether to accept a received offer. Different
user profiles may be modeled by using different utility functions to evaluate parking offers.
It is assumed that car park owners (that can be both public and private) agree to
subscribe to a Coordinated Parking System by making it available a given number of
parking spaces managed by a Parking Manager agent (PM). It is responsible for their
coordinated reselling to provide a better distribution of vehicles in the managed car parks.
Its objective is to sell parking spaces to make a profit, but also to prevent, as much as
possible, motorists to park in the red zones e.g city center, so improving the city life by
decreasing the circulation of cars in the high traffic areas. Motorists are modeled as User
Agents interacting with the PM to submit requests for parking spaces specifying their
own preferences on where to park, but also trying to pay as little as possible. Automated
negotiation between the PM and the UA is used to find a parking space allocation that
accommodates their needs up to a certain extent, i.e. by finding an acceptable compromise
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for the involved negotiators.
The length of the negotiation process could prevent its use in real-world scenarios, so
we adopt a flexible negotiation mechanism, proposed in [15], that allows to dynamically
set the negotiation duration
4.1.1 The Negotiation Model
The adopted negotiation mechanism, reported in [15], is used in the present work as
a bi-lateral negotiation whose protocol is based on a Contract Net Iterated Protocol,
and it may be iterated for a variable number of times until a deadline is reached or the
negotiation is successful. Each iteration is referred to as a negotiation round, and the
deadline is the number of allowed rounds.
According to the protocol, at the first negotiation round the UA submits its request for
a parking space specifying the preferred location area in the city area, and the requested
time interval. The PM replies sending an offer for a parking space, waiting for an accep-
tance or rejection from the UA. If the offer is accepted the negotiation ends successfully,
otherwise a new round is started, if allowed by the protocol. The PM will send as many
offers as the number of allowed rounds, that of course cannot be greater than the number
of available car parks.
In the proposed negotiation, utility functions are used to model the different needs of
the PM and the UA: the PM uses the value of the utility function to decide which offer
to send, while the UA uses the utility function to evaluate whether to accept or to reject
the received offer. The issues for the PM are the car park availability (availability)
and its distance from the center of the red zone (distance from red zones center) area
to avoid selected by PM, while the issues for the UA are the parking space price (price),
the distance of the car park from the requested location (GPS distance), and the same
distance evaluated in terms of travel time from the requested location (time distance).
So, the utility functions for the PM and the UA have the following domains:
UPM(offerPM(k)) :availability × distance from red zone center→ [0, 1]
UUA(offerPM(k)) :price× GPS distance × time distance→ [0, 1]
where, the co-domain [0, 1] indicates that the functions are normalized.
Utility functions are modeled as linear functions (as will be explained in the following
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subsections) resulting from the weighted sum of the considered issues. Different weights
can be associated with the considered parking attributes, so modeling the different im-
portance of the attributes for different classes of users, and even for different Parking
Managers. It should be noted that an offer proposed by the PM in a negotiation round
cannot be considered available in the successive rounds once rejected by the UA, since it
may be allocated to a different user, or its price may change according to the number of
requests.
4.1.2 The User Agent request
It is assumed that motorists interact with a Coordinated Parking System, by submitting
a request for a parking space to the Car Park Server through several devices (e.g. Tablet,
Smart-Phone, PDA or PC), using a city map to select the area where he/she would like
to park, and an interface to indicate his/her parking preferences. The Parking Manager
is responsible for processing the request: it queries an internal database to retrieve in-
formation on the available car parks, and it relies on specific applications to extract car
park availability when the request is processed, and to collect relevant information on city
regulations, or on events that may affect public transportation.
Each car park is characterized by the following parameters:
car park= <park id, park GPS location, ref price unit,
park capacity, sector>
where park id is the unique identifier of the car park, park GPS location is its GPS lo-
cation, ref price unit is the default time unit price for a parking space, park capacity
is the total number of parking spaces in the car park, and sector represents the geo-
graphical location of the car park with respect to the red zone. A sector identifies a
ring and its value is an integer.
The distribution of sectors starting from the center of a red zone is shown, in Fig. 4.1
and it is used to model the relation of the price offered for a parking space on the distance
between the car park and the centre of the red zone.
A User Agent request, park req, is composed of values referred to the parking space
attributes that are relevant for the user to decide where to park:
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Figure 4.1: Representation of city sectors.
park req= <id req, dest GPS location, start time,
end time>
where id req is the unique identifier of the user request, dest GPS location represents
the GPS location of the destination the user wants to reach, the interval (end time -
start time) represents the time the user wants to park for.
With a static selection, the PM will select car parks considering only to meet the
user requirements in terms of location, and available parking spaces for the required time
interval. If there is no parking space meeting the requirements, a static mechanism will
end up with no solutions for the driver request.
The proposed mechanism allows the evaluation of criteria that may not be explicitly
expressed by the user, and that can influence both the selection of parking spaces offered
by the PM, and the evaluation of the received offer. In fact, By using an automated
negotiation mechanism for the selection of parking spaces, it is possible to propose offers
that do not strictly meet the user requirements, but that are a result of an evaluation
of the available parking spaces against parking space attributes that are relevant to the
PM, and whose values may depend on dynamic information, take into account time-
dependent information such as car park occupancy, or special events, on the lack of
public transportation in a given time windows and so on. On the other hand, a received
offer is evaluated by the UA against parking space attributes that are relevant to the UA
and whose importance may vary for different users.
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4.1.3 The Parking Manager Model
As described, the proposed negotiation mechanism is not based on the exchange of offers
and counteroffers, since UA may only accept or reject offers. So, the PM may compute the
set of offers it will propose during negotiation, at the first round. The set of possible offers
is computed by selecting first a set of car parks that meet the following requirements:
• the distance (referred to as park GPS distance) of the car park location (park GPS
location) from the destination (dest GPS location) set by the user, is within a
given distance (referred to as the location tolerance),
• the car park have spaces available for the time interval specified by the user at the
time t the request is issued.
The location tolerance is set by the PM in such a way to include also car parks that
are not in a red zone, and consequently they may be far from the dest GPS location
specified by the user, since the PM tries to prevent users from parking in the red zones
and to maximize the occupancy of car parks not located in a red zones.
In order to push users to park outside the red zones and in car parks with more parking
spaces available, a dynamic cost model is associated to the Coordinated Parking System.
The PM calculates the unit price to offer for a parking space by considering that car
parks located in the red zones are more expensive. In fact, according to the distribution
reported in Figure 4.1, the area around the red zone is divided in sectors, that account for
the distance between a car park and the specific red zone. The price associated to parking
spaces depends on the sector the corresponding car park belongs to, so the farther the
car park is from the red zone, the cheaper it is. In addition, in order to incentivize the
occupancy of less crowded car parks, a discount factor can be applied to each car park in
accordance to its occupancy with respect to its total capacity.
The PM includes in the offer also the distance GPS distance and time time distance
necessary to travel from car park offered to the destination. time distance is evaluated
as travel time by using public or other means of transportation (time distance). Also
information is assumed to be retrieved with the support of external services. So, an offer
of the PM is:
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offer(k) = < park id, GPS distance, dest time distance,
park price unit >
Once the PM computes the set of possible offers, it needs to establish which one to
offer at each negotiation round, i.e. it needs to establish its concession strategy during
negotiation. In order to do so, the PM uses a private utility function to rank the selected
car parks. The evaluation function used by the PM to compute the utility of each car




(αi ∗ qi,k −minj(qi,j)
maxj(qi,j)−minj(qi,j)) (4.1)
where n is the number of issues the agent is evaluating, qi,k is the value of the i-th is-
sue of the k-th car park, minj(qi,j) and maxj(qi,j) are respectively the minimum and the
maximum values of the i-th issue among all the car parks selected by the PM, and the
constants αi are weights associates to the different issues with
n∑
i=1
αi = 1. As previously
described, the issues for the PM are:
q1 = availability
q2 = distance from red zone center
Once the set of offers is ordered according to the utility values of Equation 4.1, the
PM sends as first offer the one with the highest utility value, and it concedes in utility
offering, at each negotiation round, parking spaces with a monotonically decreasing value
of its own utility. The PM will end the negotiation with a failure if all the car parks
selected have been offered and not accepted. If an offer is accepted by the UA, then the
negotiation ends successfully.
4.1.4 The User Agent Model
The evaluation function used by the UA to compute the utility of each offer proposed by
PM is the following:










where, m is the number of issues the agent is evaluating, qi,k the value i-th issue of the
k-th offer, ci is the preferred value over the i-th issue, hi are constant values introduced
for normalizing each term of the formula into the set [0,1], and βi are weights associates
to the different issues with
m∑
i=1
βi = 1. The weights are used to model different type of
drivers:
• business, i.e. drivers that consider very important the location of the parking
space with respect to the destination they need to reach, also being available to
spend more money to get it (β1 < β2),
• tourist, i.e. drivers that are available to choose a parking space not so close to their
preferred destination, provided that they can save money (β1 > β2).
The UA strategy is to accept an offer if its utility value is above a threshold value (UAatt)
representing a measure of its attitude to be flexible on its preferred values for the con-
sidered parking space attributes. Since the utility function is normalized, its values may
range in the interval [0, 1]. It should be noted that at each negotiation iteration, the UA
utility varies according to the received offer, so it is not monotonic as the PM one.
Moreover, we assume that the preferred ci values are reasonable with respect to each
considered issue, i. e. the preferred user values are not unreasonable in relation to the
issue (this means that the user cannot ask for a parking space for free!). If qi,k − ci < 0
than the term is set to zero. As previously described, the issues for the UA are:
q1 = price
q2 = GPS distance
q3 = time distance
At each round, the UA calculates its utility for the received offer according to Equation
4.2, and it accepts it only if the utility value is greater than the predefined threshold.
Otherwise, it rejects the offer and waits for another offer, or for a message of negotiation
end.
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4.2 A Social-Aware Parking Space Selection
We propose to find an allocation of parking spaces that is viable from a global social benefit
point of view. In many decision-making situations in transportation, the competitive
alternatives and their characteristics are reasonably well known in advance to the decision
makers (driver). On the other hand, drivers usually discover different parking alternatives
one by one in a temporal sequence. Clearly, this temporal sequence has a very strong
influence on the driver’s final decision about the parking space. In our research, the
Parking Manager selects a set of car parks belonging to the Coordinated Parking System,
but the temporal sequence in which they are offered during negotiation privileges first car
parks meeting also city needs requirements.
The goal of the negotiation between the User Agent and the Parking Manager is to se-
lect a parking space that represents a viable compromise between the driver’s and the city
needs (represented by the Parking Manager preferences), so reaching a sort of utilitarian
social welfare. The concept of social welfare, as studied in welfare economics, is an at-
tempt to characterize the well-being of a society in relation to the welfare of its individual
members [7]. The proposed negotiation mechanism relies on the utilitarian interpretation
of the concept of social welfare in multi agent systems literature, i.e. whatever increases
the average welfare of the agents of a society is considered beneficial for the society as
well.
4.3 A Prototype Implementation
In order to provide Smart Cities with an intelligent smart parking solution to be inte-
grated in a more complex Coordinated Parking System, we designed and implemented
a web-based multi-agent application to automatically select parking spaces in reply to
user’s requests. The application was tested in a case study based on both real and sim-
ulated information, to assess the suitability of software agent negotiation in the context
of intelligent parking. The architecture of the implemented prototype is shown in Figure
4.2 reporting its main components.
The negotiation module is implemented by using the JADE framework [9] to imple-
ment the UA and the PM, and relying on its communication primitives to implement the
adopted negotiation protocol. JADE is an open source software framework for developing
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Figure 4.2: The prototype architecture of the smart parking application.
applications that implement agent and multi-agent systems. It is a Java based agent de-
velopment environment providing libraries designed to support communication between
agents in compliance with Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) specifica-
tions. The multi-agent system is composed of the UAs and the PM. The PM is enveloped
in an application server, more specifically on Apache Web Server extended with Tomcat,
and it is able to communicate with external services and information sources:
• Google Map Server [51] to retrieve walking distance and travel time from a selected
car park to the user’s destination location,
• the Car Park Database to retrieve information on the available car parks,
• City Manager facilities to retrieve information regarding roads accessibility-related
information.
The contents of the Car Park Database are retrieved from the OpenStreetMap application
[29], that is implemented using PostgreSQL, an object-relational database management
system, and PostGIS an open source software providing support for geographic objects to
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the PostgreSQL database. The user’s application also queries OpenStreetMap to obtain
maps for the interface it interacts with.
4.4 Experimentation with Smart Parking Applica-
tion
In order to assess how software agent negotiation can be used in the selection of parking
spaces in an urban area, we carried out several experiments. In this section we reported
some of this experiments considering the city of Naples as the target area. In subsection
4.4.1 we investigate the use of software agents negotiation allows to assign parking spaces
in an automatic and intelligent manner by taking into account that users needs and
parking vendors needs regarding efficient allocation of parking spaces, and city regulations.
In particular in subsection 4.4.2 we evaluate the benefit in using negotiation to select
parking solutions that represent a compromise between the needs of both the PM and
the UA, comparing with the parking spaces chosen respectively by the PM and the UA
in the case of complete information sharing among agents, and of no shared information.
Finally, in subsection 4.4.3 we evaluate with different metrics the social benefit of the
parking allocation in terms of both agents utilities, and allocation efficiency.
4.4.1 Smart parking allocation
In this subsection, we firstly report a set of experiments carried out in order to determine
whether the negotiation is a viable approach in order to meet both users and parking
managers requirements.
The experiments simulate 150 different queries made by users by selecting a destination
on the interactive map of the city centre of Naples provided by the Coordinated Parking
System, and associating to the destination the time interval which the user wants to
park for. In this case, the city center represents the red zone. The destinations selected
by the users are located in sectors 1 and 2 on the city map shown in Figure 4.3. For
each query a negotiation run takes place. At the first negotiation round, the PM selects
the car parks according to the query as reported in subsection 4.1.3. Parking identifiers
and locations are extracted from the OpenStreetMap database of the city of Naples, while
routing information (dest GPS distance and dest time distance) are retrieved through
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Figure 4.3: Reference scenario.
the use of Google MAPs API. The occupancy of car parks is randomly generated for each
negotiation run.
The weights in the utility functions are equally distributed among issues (αi = 0.5 and
βi = 0.33 for all i), while, for each issue i, hi and ci are dynamically set respectively to
maxj(qi,j) and medj(qi,j) (i.e., the maximum and the medium value for the current issue).
The UA accepts an offer if its utility for that offer is greater than a threshold value set
to 0.6 for the experiments.
4.4.1.1 Experimental Results
The first experimental results are summarized in Table 4.1 in case of successful negotia-
tions. In particular, the table reports the maximum, the minimum and the mean value
(with the standard deviation), obtained at the end of each negotiation run, of the number
of selected car parks (# available parks), the number of negotiation rounds (# Rounds),
the parking spaces available in the car park (Availability), the distance between the se-
lected car park and the city center (Distance), the distance between the selected car park
and the user’s destination (Route), the parking space unit price (Price), the travel time
to reach the destination from the car park (Time), the PM utility (PM Utility), and the
UA utility (UA Utility).
The mean value of rounds (that is the number of offers sent by the PM) is very low
with respect to the mean number of car parks selected by PM for the experiments. This
means that the negotiation ends before the PM offers all the selected car parks, and the
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max value min value mean value
# Available parks 14 10 11± 2
# Rounds 9 1 3.3± 2.5
Availability 237 1 110± 58
Distance (m) 7339 1948 3495± 360
Route (m) 4355 649 1105± 160
Price (up) 8.9 5.1 7.6± 0.3
Time (s) 3046 457 927± 211
PM Utility 0.97 0.03 0.62± 0.22
UA Utility 0.75 0.10 0.68± 0.06
PM Utility without Neg − − 0.35± 0.27
UA Utility without Neg − − 0.71± 0.04
Table 4.1: Experimental Data collected in 150 runs.
obtained mean utility values for the UA and PM show that the requirements of both
parties can be met in a satisfactory way.
With the same settings we evaluated the PM and the UA mean value utilities obtained
in the case the complete set of offers selected by the PM is known to the UA as well
reported in the last two rows in Table 4.1. Figure 4.4 reports a graphical representation
of the different utility values respectively for the PM and the UA on the interactive city
map. In this case the UA would select the offer that maximizes its own utility (in the
average 0.71), that corresponds to a low utility for the PM (in the average 0.35). As
expected, in this way, the UA requirements are privileged with respect to the PM ones.
In Table 4.2 experimental results are reported for two negotiation runs with the same
query, but varying the occupancy of the selected car parks. The Table reports the values
of the issues of each offer for both the PM and UA, and their utilities. According to
the negotiation mechanism, at each negotiation round, the PM selects the offer with the
best utility value, among the remaining offers. The negotiation ends as soon as the UA
utility for an offer is greater than its threshold value. As shown in Table 4.2, varying
the occupancy of the selected car parks impacts the length of the negotiation (i.e., the
number of rounds necessary to reach an agreement).
These experimental set, we show that an automated negotiation mechanism between
the Parking Manager and motorists represented by User Agents, allows to find a com-
promise, through the use of utility functions for the involved negotiators that manage
different needs to be dynamically evaluated, and help users in their decision making pro-
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Figure 4.4: User Agent and Parking Manager Utilities.
# Rounds ID Availability Distance Price Route Time PM Utility UA Utility
1◦ 417856728 78 3530 7.78 1849 1676 0.77 0.19
2◦ 2204657189 27 4389 5.14 2151 1951 0.65 0.18
3◦ 1495201878 40 3719 7.30 1442 1110 0.59 0.45
4◦ 2245281153 87 2357 7.59 1030 720 0.58 0.62
# Rounds ID Availability Distance Price Route Time PM Utility UA Utility
1◦ 2204658556 171 3712 7.46 1126 848 0.72 0.53
2◦ 2239471042 237 2273 7.99 1263 1013 0.56 0.43
3◦ 2204657189 2 4389 5.82 2151 1951 0.50 0.11
4◦ 2204657190 7 3946 7.86 1525 1790 0.41 0.19
5◦ 1495201878 18 3719 7.52 1442 1110 0.40 0.39
6◦ 417856728 36 3530 7.92 1849 1676 0.40 0.18
7◦ 2245281149 138 2434 7.17 883 725 0.39 0.63
Table 4.2: Negotiation on a single query.
cess. The first experiments carried out shows that negotiation is a viable and promising
approach since a solution is found before all the selected car parks are proposed to users.
The second experimental result shows that car parks occupancy have an impact on the
length of negotiation and further experiments will be carried out to find the relation
between the occupancy percentage and the length of negotiation.
4.4.2 The Football Match
Another set of experiments was carried out to evaluate how software agent negotiation can
be used in the selection of parking spaces in an urban area to push motorists to consider
parking solutions that are not only biased on their preferences.
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Figure 4.5: Queries distribution in sectors 0, 1 and 2.
The reference scenario consists of a set of users that make requests to park in different
zones of Naples on the day a football match will take place. For this reason, it is considered
beneficial for the city to make motorists to avoid the area around the football stadium
for parking, in order to limit traffic congestion. So, the red zone is represented by the
city sector (sector 0) centered in the location of the football stadium, with a radius set
to 500m The rest of the city is split in sectors as well, starting from sector 0, with an
exponential increased radius. The experiments simulate 60 queries (qi) with destination
locations distributed in sectors 0, 1 and 2 (20 queries in each sector), as shown in Figure
4.5. The sectors are determined with respect to the red zone (target t), and the destination
locations are randomly generated. The threshold value for all users is set to 0.7 in all the
experiments.
For each generated query the negotiation process between the UA and the PM takes
place. In Table 4.3 we report, for each set of queries (respectively for sector 0, sector 1 and
sector 2), the mean value together with the standard deviation of the following attributes
of the parking space (si) selected after the negotiation: the UA and PM utilities (UUA and
UPM), its distance from the red zone (Dist(t)), its walking distance (Dist(qi)) and travel
time distance with public means of transportation (Time(qi)) from the query destination
location, its offered price (Price), its position in the PM ranking (RankPM), and the
social welfare value (SW ), obtained as the sum of UA and PM utilities. The ranking
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si UUA UPM Dist(t) m Dist(qi) m Price euro T ime(qi) s RankPM SW
sector 0 0.75± 0.04 0.83± 0.22 1089± 255 866± 228 2.8± 0.4 269± 109 11± 10 1.59± 0.23
sector 1 0.75± 0.05 0.91± 0.09 1650± 304 1053± 167 2.2± 0.7 212± 77 3.8± 3.3 1.66± 0.11
sector 2 0.83± 0.04 0.93± 0.11 2399± 377 1145± 219 0.9± 0.8 213± 59 2.2± 2.1 1.76± 0.13
total 0.78± 0.07 0.89± 0.15 1713± 624 1021± 234 1.9± 1.0 232± 87 5.5± 7.1 1.67± 0.18
Table 4.3: Experimental data of park selection (si) w.r.t the queries qi after the negotia-
tion.
position of si corresponds to the number of the negotiation round at which the offer was
sent by the PM, so representing the length of the negotiation (i.e., the number of rounds
necessary to reach an agreement between the UA and the PM).
The obtained results show that the PM and UA utility values for the selected parking
space increase when users’ destination locations are far from the red zone. Furthermore,
the negotiation length increases when users want to park in the red zone since it is more
difficult to find a compromise. In fact, when users require destination locations far from
the red zone the social welfare (last column of Table 4.3) increases since the needs of both
the PM and the UA are easily satisfied. The distribution of the selected parking spaces
for the considered queries is reported in Figure 4.6, showing that the parking spaces are
selected in accordance with the objective to prevent motorists from parking in the red
zone.
UAbest UUA UPM Dist(t) m Dist(qi) m Price euro T ime(qi) s RankPM SW
sector 0 0.91± 0.06 0.21± 0.20 390± 163 339± 232 4.5± 1.0 101± 86 34± 5 1.12± 0.18
sector 1 0.98± 0.06 0.66± 0.17 1114± 217 473± 106 2.8± 0.4 115± 62 17± 6 1.64± 0.20
sector 2 0.99± 0.05 0.75± 0.14 1830± 463 616± 282 1.5± 1.0 114± 63 9± 6 1.74± 0.16
total 0.96± 0.06 0.54± 0.29 1112± 666 476± 244 2.9± 1.5 110± 70 20± 12 1.50± 0.33
Table 4.4: Data of UA best choices (UAbest) w.r.t. the queries qi without negotiation.
PMbest UUA UPM Dist(t) m Dist(qi) m Price euro T ime(qi) s RankPM SW
sector 0 0.44± 0.18 1± 0 1332± 153 1496± 362 2.5± 0.0 385± 109 1± 0 1.44± 0.18
sector 1 0.56± 0.21 1± 0 1875± 241 1656± 920 1.9± 0.9 240± 85 1± 0 1.56± 0.21
sector 2 0.57± 0.26 1± 0 2580± 350 2006± 1057 1.5± 1.0 114± 63 1± 0 1.57± 0.26
total 0.52± 0.22 1± 0 1929± 576 1720± 849 1.6± 1.0 294± 123 1± 0 1.52± 0.22
Table 4.5: Data for the PM best choices (PMbest) w.r.t. the queries qi without negotiation.
In order to assess the benefit in using negotiation to find a compromise between the PM
and the UA, we also evaluated the attribute values of parking spaces chosen respectively
by the PM and the UA without negotiation. In this case, the PM and the UA select
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Figure 4.6: Selected parking spaces for the UA queries with negotiation.
respectively the best parking space that maximizes their own utility functions. Of course,
in order for the PM and the UA to choose the best parking space, it is assumed that they
both share the same information concerning the available parking spaces.
In Table 4.4 the same attributes described in Table 4.3 are reported for the best
parking space for the UA (UAbest). As expected, in this case, the UA preferences are
privileged while the PM utility value increases only for locations far from the red zone.
Note that the ranking position of the selected parking space for the PM is in average 20,
meaning that in case of negotiation such parking space would be offered to the UA only
after 20 rounds, so requiring a longer (and hence more costly) negotiation with respect
to the case reported in Table 4.3, where the average number of rounds is 5.5. Finally, the
price of the UAbest is in the average higher than the price of the si because it corresponds
to parking spaces nearer to the query locations and, hence, nearer, in average, to the red
zone.
In Table 4.5 the same information as Table 4.4 is reported, but considering the best
parking space for the PM (PMbest). In this case the PM preferences are privileged, while
the UA utility value increases only for locations far from the red zone. Of course, the
ranking value of the best parking space for the PM is 1, because it is normalized with
respect to the max values of the parking attributes available for each query.
The average values of social welfare, reported in the last rows of Tables 4.4 and 4.5,
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are lower than the one obtained with negotiation, since in these cases only the needs of
one agent (respectively the UA and the PM) are taken into consideration. By the way,
the average values of SW in the three tables are very close, but the values relative to each
sector differ, so showing that negotiation is useful to improve social welfare when users
want to park close to a red zone (i.e., for sector 0), while for sector 1 and 2 the social
welfare is comparable.
The distribution of the best parking spaces for the UA, reported in Figure 4.7, is
similar to the distribution of query locations, meaning that without negotiation users are
not prevented from parking in the red zone. While the distribution of the best parking
spaces for the PM, reported in Figure 4.8, is similar to the distribution of the parking
spaces selected with negotiation since in this case the PM needs are considered.
4.4.3 Computing the Social Benefit of a Parking Allocation Pro-
cess
In the set of experiments reported, we have already shown that negotiation is a viable
approach to push drivers to select parking spaces that are also beneficial from a city
point of view, at the level of single parking requests. In this subsection, we consider a
global parking allocation problem for a set of requests, to be fulfilled with fixed number of
available parking spaces When considering a whole set of parking space requests, each one
Figure 4.7: Distribution of UAbest parking space without negotiation.
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Figure 4.8: Distribution of PMbest parking space without negotiation.
processed through a negotiation process, the problem can be assimilated to a distributed
indivisible resource allocation problem, where the selection of resources to be allocated
for a specific request is carried out through a bilateral negotiation without considering
the other requests. In our case, given a set of available resources R (i.e., parking spaces),
and a set of driver agents UA, the overall process is to assign a single resource to each
request (if available), in order to best match the UA request and, at the same time, to
fulfill as many requests as possible. In resource allocation problems the social welfare is
used as a metric to evaluate the efficient allocation of resources [19]. Hence, social welfare,
computed for all requests, fulfilled or not, can be used also as a metric to evaluate an
efficient allocation of parking spaces as follows.
In order to provide a measure of the social benefit of an allocation that takes into
account different needs, the negotiation was evaluated in terms of the obtained social wel-
fare of the global outcome of all negotiations occurring for the received parking requests.
Different types of social welfare were evaluated by taking into that account:
• the distribution of parking spaces with respect to only drivers needs,
• the same distribution with respect to both drivers and city manager needs,
• the same distribution with respect to how the drivers and city needs are balanced.
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Both the UA and the PM face a maximization problem when negotiating with each other,
i.e. both agents try to maximize their individual utility.
Given a set of User Agents requesting a parking space, an optimal allocation of re-
sources is the one that maximizes the social welfare of the driver agents, i.e., SWUA =∑
i∈UA Ui(xagr). Note that Ui depends only on the agent i and on the selected parking
space (agr). Hence, the overall utility of a set of UAs corresponds to the sum of the
individual utilities. In order to get a global utility value that does not depend on the





Equation 4.3 accounts for the social welfare of driver agents and for the allocation
problem in the sense that a high number of fulfilled requests with a high average utility
will result in a high SWUA value. However, in order to evaluate the social benefit of such
an allocation of parking spaces, the social welfare should include also the utility of the
PM. In fact, there could be two parking spaces that have the same utility for the UA,
but one is more beneficial for the city welfare, i.e., it has a greater utility for the PM, so
being a Pareto optimal solution with respect to the other one. For this reason, a social
welfare evaluation should include the PM utility, so in our case a fair outcome of the
negotiation is an agreement that maximizes a global social welfare (SW+) obtained, for





The adopted definition of social welfare does not account for situations with an in-
equality distribution of utilities among agents. In order to detect these situations the





In the following subsections, we will use Equations 4.3,4.4, and 4.5 to evaluate the
outcome of negotiation for the parking spaces allocation problem.
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4.4.3.1 Negotiation Simulation
In order to assess if the proposed negotiation mechanism is able to push drivers to select a
parking space beneficial for the different involved entities, an experimentation was carried
out simulating a set of drivers’ requests sequentially processed in a time window. The
experiments are aimed to evaluate the percentage of the allocated parking spaces with
respect to the number of processed requests, the available car parks, and the corresponding
PM and UAs utilities. Currently, two UA profiles are considered:
• strict, i.e. drivers who are quite strict on their preferences, i.e. they are character-
ized by a high threshold value,
• flexible, i.e. drivers who are more flexible on their preferences, i.e. they are char-
acterized by a low threshold value.
The evaluation is carried out against two baseline cases. In the first case, the avail-
ability and locations of all parking spaces is known to the UA, i.e., there is a com-
plete knowledge setting. The UA selects the parking space (xi) with the highest util-
ity (xi = argmax(UUA(xj)), ∀j), and it reserves it if this utility is above its threshold
(UUA(xi) > UAatt). In the second case, the PM selects the parking space with the highest
utility (xi = argmax(UPM(xj)), ∀j) to offer, and the UA accepts it if its own utility for
that offer is above the threshold (UUA(xi) > UAatt).
All requests specify a random destination that is located in the the first sector of the
Historic Centre of Naples (Figure 4.9) with a radius of 500m. The considered car parks
are located in city sectors ranging within a radius of 5km from the city center and none
located in the first sector that is assumed to be a pedestrian area.
The requests are issued by four different types of users as follows:
• Flexible business: UAatt = 0.5, β1 = 0.3, and β2 = 0.7;
• Strict business: UAatt = 0.7, β1 = 0.3, and β2 = 0.7;
• Flexible tourist: UAatt = 0.5, β1 = 0.7, and β2 = 0.3;
• Strict tourist: UAatt = 0.7, β1 = 0.7, and β2 = 0.3.
The PM instead has the same preferences on the attributes included in its utility function,
i.e. α1 = α2 = 0.5 The number of processed requests is 50 or 100, and the number of
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Figure 4.9: A representation of Historic Centre of Naples split in sectors.
total available parking spaces is 100 equally distributed over 20 car parks. The requests
are processed one by one, and if a request is satisfied the corresponding assigned parking
space is reserved, and it is not available for the other requests. If a request is not satisfied
it is discarded and not processed anymore. We recall that the deadline of a negotiation
may vary for each request according to the number of car parks with available places for
that request.
4.4.3.2 Experimental Results
In Table 4.6, the overall UAs and PM utility values (UUA and UPM) and the percentage
of successful allocations (%all.) are reported, normalized w.r.t. the number of requests,
in the case of 50 and 100 requests. Such utilities are evaluated for the negotiation case
(Negotiation), and for the two baseline cases, i.e., the selection on the best parking space
respectively for the UA (UA–best), and the PM (PM–best).
The results show that with negotiation a better parking space allocation is obtained
(94% and 91%), with an increased overall utility for the UAs (0.68 and 0.67). Furthermore,
the results confirm that with negotiation also the PM utility increases, so potentially
finding an allocation that is more beneficial for the city as well (0.64 and 0.55). As
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50 req./100 spaces 100 req./100 spaces
UUA UPM %all. UUA UPM %all.
Negotiation 0.68 0.64 94% 0.67 0.55 91%
UA–best 0.66 0.38 86% 0.60 0.38 79%
PM–best 0.31 0.37 46% 0.32 0.39 48%
Table 4.6: UAs and PM utilities in different settings.
expected, when privileging only the PM needs (PM–best) the PM utility does not increase,
compared to the negotiation case because of the high number of failures in the allocation
process for both 50 and 100 requests (respectively 46% and 48%).
50 Req./100 spaces
SWUA max(SWUA) SW+ max(SW+) SW∗ max(SW∗)
Negotiation 0.68 0.76 0.67 0.73 0.44 0.53
UA–best 0.66 0.66 0.52 0.71 0.29 0.57
PM–best 0.31 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.25 0.26
100 Req./100 spaces
SWUA max(SWUA) SW+ max(SW+) SW∗ max(SW∗)
Negotiation 0.67 0.72 0.64 0.69 0.40 0.47
UA best 0.60 0.60 0.49 0.65 0.29 0.51
PM best 0.32 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.27 0.28
Table 4.7: SWUA, SW+, and SW∗ values for 50 and 100 requests.
In Table 4.7 the social welfare values (SWUA, SW+, and SW∗), evaluated respectively
with Equation 4.3,4.4, and 4.5, are reported along with their corresponding optimal values
(max(SWUA), max(SW+), and max(SW∗)) for the cases of 50 and 100 requests. It
should be noted that the definition of Equation 4.3 is exactly the overall UAs utility
(SWUA = UUA).
As already highlighted in Table 4.6, a better overall utility for the UAs is obtained
with negotiation, also compared with the UA–best baseline case. This unexpected result
is due to the fact that negotiation leads to an increased percentage of parking spaces
allocation, and hence, while the average value of the utilities is sub–optimal (i.e., it is
less than max(SWUA), 0.68 < 0.76 and 0.67 < 0.72), it is greater than the optimal
value achieved in the case UA–best (0.68 > 0.66 and 0.67 > 0.60). So even though this
negotiation simulation does not lead to an optimal social welfare, it still improves the
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social welfare with respect to the case of shared information.
When including the PM utility in the social welfare (SW+), the values obtained with
the negotiation are greater than both baseline cases. In addition, these values are now
closer to their respective optimal values (max(SW+)), i.e., the negotiation results in near
optimal global outcomes.
Finally, negotiation allows for a better balancing of utilities among the involved agents,
as showed by the values reported for SW∗ (0.44 > 0.29 and 0.40 > 0.29). Nevertheless,
the values of max(SW∗) with and without negotiation represent an opposite behaviour,
apparently showing that utilities could be more balanced without negotiation. But this is
not the case since the values of max(SW∗) are not comparable with each other. In fact,
the maximum values are considered only at local level for each selection step, but they
do not represent the global maximum values for the overall selection process, that should
instead be evaluated for all the possible permutations of allocations.
So, the results of the experiments carried out confirm that negotiation leads in av-
erage to better allocations and utilities for all the adopted measures when compared to
experiments carried out without negotiation.
4.5 Related Works
Multi-agent negotiation has already been used in Intelligent Transportation System ap-
plications. In [1] cooperative agent negotiation is used to optimize traffic management
relying on shared knowledge between drivers and network operators about routing pref-
erences. In [41] a negotiation algorithm is designed for negotiating routes based on the
calculation of routes utility, while in [13] agent negotiation is used for dynamic parking
allocation, focusing on satisfying driver’s preferences on prices and distances. Negotiation
in smart parking application was used in [41] to determine the price of a car park. In
our approach, the price of a car park is not negotiable, but it is dynamically set so to
incentive users to select parking spaces located in specific urban areas. In our work a
dynamic price mechanism is used as one of the factors influencing both the generation
and the evaluation of parking offers.
Dynamic pricing mechanisms are being used in the context of parking applications. In
[67] the authors presented, as in our case, a smart parking application that tries to find
a trade–off between benefits of both drivers and parking providers. To balance the needs
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of involved parties, they use a dynamic parking price mechanism as an incentive, as also
used in [40], for the drivers to balance the convenience and cost in terms of parking price
and the convenience in terms of parking distance from the user’s destination. Differently
from our approach, in [67] all the information is available and the parking selection is
obtained as a maximization of drivers’ utilities. Dynamic price mechanisms were also
explored in [42], where the objective was to set up prices for available parking spaces in
a such a way to propose the most efficient parking allocation, in terms of social welfare,
intended as the total utility value of all agents for which a parking space is allocated. The
social welfare in our approach is a result of a mediation of the conflicting needs of drivers
and the city management.
We showed that negotiation improves the allocation of parking spaces when a complete
set of requirement is processed. In our case the allocation problem is addressed but
taking into account also other requirements (both of PM and UA) and not only the best
exploitation of available parking spaces.
The optimal allocation of cars in car parks was also studied in [43], where the authors
propose a semi–centralized approach for optimizing the parking space allocation, and
improving the fairness among parking zones by balancing their occupancy–load. In this
approach, parking coordinators are used to distribute the optimization allocation problem
that is not manageable in a centralized way. In [26] the parking space allocation strategy,
is also implemented as a global optimization problem, through the use of a Mixed Integer
Linear Program. It is based on a user’s objective function that combines proximity to
destination and parking cost, while ensuring that the overall parking capacity is efficiently
utilized. A set of requests are collected in a given time window, and they are processed by
a software module producing an overall allocation that tries to optimize ad hoc function
describing both driver–specific requirements, and system–wide objectives. In our case, the
use of negotiation allows to model the parking space allocation problem not as a global
optimization problem, but as the possibility to find a feasible compromise accommodating
different needs. In our approach, we showed that a negotiation process is more effective,




The research work of this thesis was carried out in the context of two PON funded by
the MIUR on Smart City and Social Innovation, OR.C.HE.S.T.R.A. and S2-Move, whose
common goal is to promote the utilization of the modern Information and Communication
Technologies in the cities, to develop smart platforms as decision support systems, that
provide a set of technological solutions directed towards valorization and requalification of
urban area. These platforms provide Service Based Applications (SBAs) aimed to satisfy
users’ requests by increasing the quality of life of city-dwellers.
It is well known Service Oriented Computing (SOC) is the enabling technology for
development of SBAs, in fact promotes to assemble applications into loosely-coupled net-
works of services, where a service is any software entity developed on standard (Web
Service), able to communicate through well-defined protocols that allow interoperability
between different software systems. The SOC allows to integrate and develops different
systems and functionality available through the network, in order to provide value-added
functionality difficult to achieve with a single monolithic application.
In this context, we investigated the possibility of using advanced software mechanisms
that enable the delivery of dynamic and adaptive Service-Based Applications (SBA), in
highly dynamic environments and variable as those of the Smart City, also taking into
account non-functional aspects of such applications, known as Quality of Services (QoS).
Indeed, the evolution of the Internet from a vision document-centric to that of service-
centric, led to a characterization of services that includes not only the functionality they
offer, but also the ways in which the service is provided (e.g. cost, response time, reliability,
reputation and so on), and their value may differ from one service to another.
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The reference scenario in this work consists in a Smart City modeled as a dynamic
market of services in which users and suppliers of services must interact. The user will
issue a request for an SBA specifying the functionality of each service component, their
functional dependence constraints, and the value(s) of the quality attribute(s) they want
the application to provide. The suppliers provide in an independent and autonomous
manner their services that, once aggregated, satisfy the requirements of users both from a
functional point of view and from what concerns the overall QoS values of the application
(end-to-end requirements). In this scenario, we assume that the QoS attribute values
for the same service may change in time according to dynamic circumstances as: service
provision, according to market trends, provision strategies, and so on.
Therefore, the research activities carried out are focused on the study of innovative
methods for modelling and managing, the development of applications based on composi-
tion of services. Since software agents provide an appropriate paradigm to design scalable
and open systems as the one based on SOC, we propose to use multi-agent paradigm to
model services providers and users, and to adopt automated negotiation as a tool for mod-
eling the interactions between providers and users of services. Automated negotiation was
adopted both for the dynamic composition of services that meets specific requirements
of QoS, and as a mechanism to develop a decision support tool for smart mobility en-
abling the achievement of an agreement between the users and providers of services in the
presence of conflicting interests.The negotiation mechanism proposed is based on Iterated
Contract-Net Interaction Protocol ICNIP, and two main roles are identified: initiator of
the negotiation that cannot build a counter-proposal and may only accept or reject an
offer; providers that proposes the most convenient offer for itself, willing to concede in
order to be selected.
For what concerning the first aspect of this research work, it is assumed that service
providers (Service Providers - SPs) are modeled as software agents and a Service Com-
positor agent (SC), is on agent acting on behalf of a user. We propose to use automated
negotiation to select a set of SPs that provide services whose QoS values, once aggre-
gated, fulfill the users’ requirements expressed as global constraints on the Services Based
Application’s QoS. In this context, we proposed to model Service Providers strategies as
Gaussian distribution to represent their stochastic behaviour in a zero-intelligent market,
for both single-issue and multi-issue negotiation cases, i.e. to negotiate with one or more
values of QoS respectively. In particular, Gaussian distribution is used to model mono-
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tonic concession strategies for Service Providers, to map values of QoS in utility value, and
to know the probability distribution of the offers. We showed that, the scaling properties
of the Gaussian distributions allow to model single-issue and multi-issue negotiations in
a uniform way. Hence, it was shown that the complexity of negotiation for SBAs depends
on the number of issues and of services composing the SBA.
In the single-issue case, we analysed the negotiation trends varying the number of
Service Providers involved, and negotiation rounds. The experiments carried out showed
that it is worth to negotiate with all available SPs in order to increase the probability of
successful negotiation, in fact in a market of services it is not possible to assume that a
promising provider will keep on sending promising offers because a less promising provider
may change its strategy in the meantime. In our approach, the increase in communication
costs is partially compensated by the fact that, as shown in the experiments, by increasing
the number of SPs the success rate of the negotiation increases. So, the overhead due to
the communication cost is partially compensated by a decrease in the negotiation length,
i.e. its overall computational cost. Furthermore, the analysis of the negotiation trends,
in different configurations, allows to gather information that can be used to evaluate
the possibility to stop negotiation if the outcome of the negotiation does not improve,
by iterating the negotiation. This is a useful feature when adopting computationally
expensive mechanisms like negotiation in service-based application settings since it is
possible to limit the negotiation length according to its trends.
Finally, we extended the Orthogonal bidding strategy in order to be applied to our
negotiation model for service composition. This extension is based on concept of weighted
reference point and the use of an heuristic for the select the more promising set of offer at
each round with all available providers, allows to achieve a near Pareto optimal agreement
with a provider agent that would have been discarded according to the adopted heuristics
since it was not promising at the beginning of the negotiation. Hence, a reference point
computed considering a set of selected offers at a given round, allows to select a different
set of offers at a successive round.
Moreover, we show that an agreement near Pareto optimal can be computed, if it
exists. The reference point so defined allow to negotiate concurrently with all available
service providers, this aspect is important when adopting negotiation for service com-
position since it avoids making the length of negotiation depending on the number of
functionality requested by user. This is even more crucial when the considered reference
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scenario for service composition is an open market of services since the time spent in
negotiation may prevent its use in these settings.
As a second approach, the automated negotiation mechanism proposed, was also used
to develop decision support tool for smart mobility, allowing to achieve an agreement
among the users and service providers in the presence of conflicting interests. In this
field of research, a Smart Parking application, including the decision tool (a prototype
application for automatic selection of parking in urban car park) has been developed.
The application allows to automatically provide a parking space the result of negotiation
between agents software agents. So, we model the parking allocation as a multi–agent
negotiation process to find an agreement between different and sometimes conflicting
needs. Negotiation occurs among User Agents acting on behalf of drivers requesting to
reserve a parking space that satisfies their own criteria, and a Parking Manager Agent
acting on behalf of a city authority that tries to allocate parking spaces by accommodating
city needs, respectively managing the allocation of parking available, and improving the
circulation of cars in the city.
In the experiments carried out with Smart Parking application, we simulated the
mechanisms of negotiation in case of a single request, and with multiple requests of parking
spaces.
We showed that negotiation is a viable approach to push drivers to select parking
spaces that are also beneficial from a city point of view, at the level of single parking
requests. Moreover, we showed that also when considering the global parking allocation
problem for a set of requests, negotiation leads to better utilities for both the UAs and
the PM, together with an improved percentage of fulfilled parking requests.
In order to provide a measure of the social benefit of an allocation that takes into
account different needs, the negotiation was evaluated in terms of the obtained social wel-
fare of the global outcome of all negotiations occurring for the received parking requests.
Different types of social welfare were evaluated by taking into account: the distribution
of parking spaces with respect to only drivers needs, the same distribution with respect
to both drivers and city manager needs, and finally the same distribution with respect to
how the drivers and city needs are balanced. The results of the experiments carried out
confirmed that negotiation leads in average to better allocations and utilities for all the
adopted measures when compared to experiments carried out without negotiation.
In conclusion, the work carried out in this research shows that the use of the multi-
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agent paradigm and of automated negotiation for Service Based Applications in the con-
text of Smart Cities is a promising approach: allows to model a ”smart” behaviour for
the providers of SBAs; makes it possible the automate the composition of services based
on specific user requirements of QoS, taking into account the variability of a market of
services in terms of QoS; allows the management of conflicting interests among providers
and users of services in applications of Smart Mobility.
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